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SAY YOU'RE SORRY: COURT-ORDERED
APOLOGIES AS A CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
Brent T. White t
This Article proposes that civil rights plaintiffs pursuing cases against
governmental defendants should be entitled to receive court-ordered apologies
as an equitable remedy. Part I discusses the importance of apology in Ameri-
can society and concludes that apology is culturally embedded as an essential
component of everyday dispute resolution. Part II provides a brief overview
of current legal scholarship in the area of apology, including the lack of such
scholarship related to court-ordered apologies as a civil remedy. Part III ar-
gues that traditional forms of compensation fail to provide adequate relief to
civil rights victims because they neglect psychological, emotional, and sym-
bolic injuries. It proposes court-ordered apologies as an effective means of
healing psychological wounds, reinforcing norms, restoring social equilib-
rium, promoting social change, and compelling governmental reform. Part
IV anticipates and responds to likely objections to court-ordered apologies,
including the misguided notion that public apologies must be sincere to be
effective. Finally, Part V provides some guidance in the art of compelled
apology.
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INTRODUCTION
Many civil rights plaintiffs want apologies. Few ever get them.
Civil rights defendants are notoriously reluctant to offer apologies,1
and in contrast to some other countries, the U.S. civil legal system
does not provide a mechanism to force recalcitrant defendants to ac-
cept responsibility by apologizing. 2 Civil rights plaintiffs are thus, as a
rule, left to do without apologies, whether they settle their cases or
I See, e.g., NICHOLAS TAVUCHiS, MFA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILI-
ATION 90-98 (1991) (discussing the general reluctance of collectivities to apologize); Jer-
emiah Marquez, Apology in L.A. Shooting Rare from Police, SAVE OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES, May 31,
2005, available at http://www.saveourcivilliberties.org/en/2005/05/1152.shtml (describ-
ing a police apology as "a rare instance of officers defying a common police taboo against
'mea culpas'"); WPRI-12 Eyewitness News, Court Ruling on Narragansett Smokeshop Raid (Fox
television broadcast, May 12, 2005) (discussing Rhode Island's refusal to apologize after a
federal appeals court found that the state violated the sovereignty of the Narragansett
tribe).
2 SeeJennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Symbolism and Incommensurability in Civil Sanctions:
Decision Makers as Goal Managers, 68 BROOK. L. REv. 1121, 1147 n.114 (2003) (noting that
court-ordered apologies are not available as a civil remedy in the United States). Countries
in which court-ordered apologies are a civil legal remedy include at least China, Japan,
Indonesia, Ukraine, Korea, and the Czech Republic. Information on other countries is not
readily available. Much has been written on the availability of apology as a legal remedy in
Japan, however. See Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The Case for Increased Use of Apology in
Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 545 (2000); John 0. Haley, Comment, The Implications of
Apology, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 499, 500 (1986); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The
Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAw & Soc'v REv.
461, 488-92 (1986); see also Dai-Kwon Choi, Freedom of Conscience and the Court-Ordered Apol-
ogyforDefamatoy Remarks, 8 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 205 (2000) (discussing apology in
Korea); Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film Piracy and Prospects
for Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 12 DEPAuL-LCAJ. ART & EN'T. L. & POL'Y 63, 83-85 (2002)
(noting that apology is a remedy for copyright infringement in China); Court to Hear Civil
Action Against "AWSJ,"JAKARTA POST, May 18, 2005, at 4 (reporting a civil suit by an Ameri-
can lobbyist who sought $50 million in damages and a formal apology in an Indonesian
court, alleging that an article falsely accused him of bribery); Yanukovych Ordered to Apologize
to Veteran, Pay Fine, INTERFAX, May 19, 2005, available at http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.
html?id-issue=11293945 (reporting that a Kiev court ordered former Ukrainian prime




litigate to the end. As a result, many plaintiffs are disillusioned by the
process of litigation, irrespective of whether they receive significant
monetary or injunctive relief. These plaintiffs aren't disillusioned be-
cause they have unreasonable expectations of the legal process; they
are disappointed because they haven't been fully compensated.
Consider a typical example: In 2003, the City and County of Hon-
olulu sponsored a Family Day Parade with the Hawaii Christian Coali-
tion.3 Flyers and advertisements on the City's Web site announced:
"Everyone is welcome to join this parade!"' 4 Parents and Friends of
Lesbians and Gays of Hawaii (PF[AG) requested an application from
the City. Almost immediately, the phrase "Everyone is welcome to
join this parade!" disappeared from the City Web site, and a week
before the parade, PFIAG received a terse letter indicating that its
application to join the parade had been denied.5 Apparently, "every-
one" did not include lesbian and gay families.
PFLAG filed suit alleging that the City had excluded it from the
parade on the basis of its viewpoint and identity.6 After first declaring
that the "lawsuit ha[d] no merit,"' 7 the City ultimately agreed to a se-
ries of significant policy and procedural changes designed to prevent
it from excluding unpopular individuals or groups from future
events. 8 It also agreed to post a diversity statement on its Web site
stating that the City "respects all of its residents and welcomes all of its
visitors regardless of race, color, sex, marital status, religion, national
origin, ancestry, age, disability, gender identification, or sexual orien-
3 See, e.g., Debra Barayuga, City Sued over Family Day Event, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., July
15, 2003, available at http://starbulletin.com/2OO3/O7/15/news/story5. html.
4 See Plaintiffs Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 57, PFLAG v. City and County of
Honolulu (No. _) (settled) (on file with author).
5 See id. at 73, 79.
6 PFLAG was represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii, of which
I was Legal Director at the time. While I have provided sources whenever possible, some
representations made in regard to facts surrounding this case are based on personal knowl-
edge and experience. For news accounts of this case, see Gay Groups Denied Participation in
Honolulu Parade, ADVOCATE, June 28, 2003, available at http://www.advocate.com/news-detail_
ektidlOOO6.asp; Craig Gima, ACLUFiles Suit over City Parade, HONOLULU STAR-BULL,June 23,
2003, at Al [hereinafter Gima, ACLUFiles Suit]; Craig Gima, Judge Signals Support for Gays in
Kids'Parade, HONOLULU STAR-BULL.,July 2, 2003, at Al; Curtis Lum, Ruling Expected on Gays
in Parade, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 2, 2003, at Bi; Mary Kaye Ritz, ACLU Sues City in
Parade Rejection, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, June 28, 2003, at B1.
7 See Gima, ACLU Files Suit, supra note 6 (quoting City of Honolulu spokesperson
Carol Costa).
8 See Mary Adamski, ACLU Deal Separates Church from July 3 Park Festivities, HONOLULU
STAR-BULL., June 23, 2004, at A3; David Waite, City to Open Parades to All, HONOLULU ADVER-
TISER, June 24, 2004, at BI.
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tation."9 And it paid almost $85,000 in plaintiff's attorney's fees. I0
From the standpoint of settlement, this was a significant victory.
The settlement was incomplete, however, because what members
of PFLAG most wanted was for the City to apologize publicly and to
acknowledge that it had wrongly excluded gay and lesbian families
from the parade. Members of PFLAG felt strongly that a public apol-
ogy was the only way to vindicate their rights and send a clear message
that discrimination against homosexuals is wrong. Unfortunately, the
City steadfastly refused to apologize. And because victory at trial
would not have forced the City to apologize at any rate, PFLAG de-
cided to settle."' True to form, the City's attorney broadcast to the
media that "the settlement does not include a statement of wrongdo-
ing by the city nor an apology." 12
Afterward, PFLAG was left to spin the settlement as a significant
victory for gay rights despite the City's refusal to apologize. 13 PFLAG's
spin may have been somewhat persuasive given that the City agreed to
pay substantial attorney's fees and post a diversity statement. But the
public message wasn't nearly as powerful or unequivocal as it would
have been had the City been forced to apologize. Worse, members of
9 Waite, supra note 8.
10 See id. As background, PFLAG originally moved for a temporary restraining order
to prevent the City from excluding it from the parade. See David Waite, Parade Dispute
Could Lead to City Guidelines, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 9, 2005 [hereinafter Waite, Parade
Dispute]. Despite the fact that City employees had planned the parade, the City responded
by stating that it was not actually sponsoring the parade and was merely providing logistical
support to the Hawaii Christian Coalition. See id. Simultaneously, the Hawaii Christian
Coalition threatened in the press to cancel the parade and leave thousands of children
disappointed if the judge ordered that it allow PFLAG tojoin. See Craig Gima, Ruling Set for
Tomorrow in Suit over 'Family Day'Parade Access, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., July 2, 2003, available
at http://starbulletin.com/2O03/07/02/news/story8.html; Lum, supra note 6. The judge
blinked, denied PFLAG's motion, and the lesbian and gay families of Honolulu were con-
fined to protest from the sidelines. See Editorial, City Doubletalk Wins in Court Case on Family
Parade, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., July 5, 2003, at All; Craig Gima, Judge Says Parade Can Ex-
clude Gay Groups, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., July 4, 2003, at Al; David Waite, Ruling Supports
Parade Organizers, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, July 4, 2003, at B3. When the case did not go
away following the parade, the judge encouraged the City to settle amid mounting evi-
dence that the City funded and organized the parade. See Waite, Parade Dispute, supra note
10.
1 While PFLAG could have gone to trial and sought nominal damages and a declara-
tory judgment, it would not have received injunctive relief, as the parade had already
passed. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail, nominal damages and declaratory
judgments lack the expressive value of an apology. See infta notes 101-03, 131 and accom-
panying text.
12 Waite, supra note 8.
13 The spin was as follows: "This global settlement reaffirms basic constitutional prin-
ciples-the government cannot censor speech or exclude people from public events sim-
ply because officials do not agree with the participants' sexual orientation, gender identity
or their message." See Press Release, ACLU, In Historic Court Victory for ACLU, Honolulu
Agrees to Create New Rules Affirming Religious Neutrality and Free Speech (June 23,
2004), available at http://www.aclu.org/religion/frb/i6355prs2OO4O623.html.
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PFLAG were left with the bitter taste of never hearing the City ac-
knowledge its wrongdoing.
This Article proposes that civil rights plaintiffs in lawsuits against
government defendants should be entitled to pursue court-ordered
apologies as an equitable remedy. 14 By way of introduction, Part I
discusses the importance of apology in American culture and con-
cludes that apology is culturally embedded as an essential component
of everyday dispute resolution. Part II provides an overview of current
legal scholarship in the area of apology, including the lack of scholar-
ship related to court-ordered apologies as a civil remedy. Part III, the
heart of the Article, argues that traditional forms of compensation fail
to provide adequate relief to civil rights victims because they do not
address emotional and symbolic injuries. Part III also proposes court-
ordered apologies as a means of healing psychological wounds, rein-
forcing norms, restoring social equilibriums, confirming the justice of
plaintiffs' causes, and compelling governmental reform. Part IV antic-
ipates and responds to likely objections to court-ordered apologies as
a civil rights remedy, including the misguided notion that public apol-
ogies must be completely sincere to be effective. Finally, Part V pro-
vides some guidance in the art of compelled apology.
I
THE IMPORTANCE OF APOLOGY IN AMERICAN CULTURE
It sometimes seems that every time one picks up a newspaper or
turns on the television, some person, group, corporation, or official is
offering, demanding, or rejecting an apology. A single Google search
on a random day in June 2005 for news articles containing the word
"apology" returned over 11,200 articles, with over 220 news stories for
that day alone. Stories ranged from the trivial-CBS apologizing to
viewers for interrupting its popular crime drama CSI: New York for a
news announcement of Yasser Arafat's death 1 5-to the disturbing-
five South Boston high school hockey players receiving probation af-
ter they apologized for raping a fifteen-year-old girl. 16 Other stories
included Wachovia Bank apologizing for its pre-Civil War links to slav-
14 Because of First Amendment concerns with compelling non-governmental actors
to apologize, see infra Part 1V.C, this article does not propose court-ordered apologies as a
general civil remedy but rather as a limited remedy against the government in civil rights
cases. The term "civil rights cases" refers to litigation claiming violations of constitutional
rights and brought under any of the panoply of state and federal civil rights statutes.
15 See Lisa de Moraes, "CSI" Interruption: The Producer Did It!, WASH. POST, Nov. 12,
2004, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A44123-2004Novll.
html. The apology read: "An overly aggressive CBS News producer jumped the gun with a
report that should have been offered to local stations for their late news. We sincerely
regret the error." Id.
16 See L.E. Campenella, Academy Sex Case a Teaching Moment, PATRIOT LEDGER, June 2,
2005, at 1.
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ery,1 7 the White House refusing to apologize for U.S. soldiers who al-
legedly mishandled the Koran at Guantanamo Bay,18 a Roman
Catholic Bishop offering yet another "profound apology" to sexual
abuse victims, 19 and two NewJersey disc jockeys apologizing for insult-
ing Asian Americans on air.20 These and the thousands of other such
stories suggest that public apologies are ubiquitous in American
culture. 21
17 See Slave Report Prompts Wachovia Contribution, ABC NEws, June 3, 2005, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=817603.
18 See Afghan Clerics Demand U.S. Apology for Alleged Quran Abuse, USA TODAY, June 14,
2005, available at http://wuww, usatoday.com/news/world/2005-06-14-cleics-koranx.htm.
19 Kentucky Catholic Diocese Offers Abuse Settlement, REUTERS, June 3, 2005, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2OO5/O6/O3/kentucky-catholicdiocese-offers-abuse_
settlement/.
20 See Emil Guillermo, The Politics of Apology, ASIAN WEEK, June 2, 2005, at 5.
21 This ubiquity extends to popular television shows, where apologies are common
fodder for plot lines. For example, an ongoing plot line on the sitcom Friends was Ross's
refusal to apologize sincerely to Rachel for sleeping with another woman when they were
"on a break." See Friends: The One with the Morning After (NBC television broadcast Feb. 20,
1997); Friends: The One with the Jellyfish (NBC television broadcast Sept. 25, 1997). Seinfeld
devoted an episode to George's frustration over not receiving an apology from a friend
going through the "making amends" part of a twelve-step program. See Seinfeld: The Apology
(NBC television broadcast Dec. 11, 1997). The television drama ER has dedicated several
shows to the issue of apology and medical malpractice. See ER. Where the Heart Is (NBC
television broadcast May 10, 2001); ER. Forgive and Forget (NBC television broadcast Feb. 26,
2004). Apologies are also prevalent in popular music: Elton John's 1976 hit Sorry Seems to
Be the Hardest Word spent fourteen weeks on the U.S. Billboard Top 40 chart, peaking at
number six. See Paul Maclauchlan, Charting the Rocket Man: 30 Years of Elton John on
the Pop Charts, http://www.vex.net/-paulmac/elton/ej chart.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2006). Other artists have produced popular songs about apology. See, e.g., Howie Day with
Sorry So Sorry, on MADRIGALS (Sony 2003), Eminem with Cleanin' Out My Closet, on EMINEM
SHOW (Interscope Records 2002), Connie Francis with Who's Sorry Now? (MGM 1958), R.
Kelly with Apologies of a Thug, on CHOCOLATE FACTORY (Bonus CD) (Jive 2003), S Club 8
with Don't Tell Me You're Sorry, on DON'T TELL ME YOU'RE SORRY (Universal 2003), Ruben
Studdard of American Idol fame with Sorry 2004, on SOULFUL (J-records 2003), and UB40
with Sorry, on PROMISES AND LIES (Virgin Records 1993). Apologies strike at the heart of
human experience. Indeed, if news reports are an indication, the importance of apology
transcends culture. See Bofors: BJP Ridicules Cong Demand for Apology, OUTLOOKINDIA.COM,
June 2, 2005, http://www.outlookindia.com/pti-news.asp?id=301974 (reporting the In-
dian Bharatiya Janata Party's ridiculing of a rival party's demand for an apology from per-
sons making allegations about former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi); De Lille Deserves
Apology, Says ID Whip, INDEP. ONLINE, June 2, 2005, http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?set
_id=1&click_id=15&art_id=qw1 117715041427B223 (reporting a South African politician's
demands for an apology after she received death threats for raising concerns about an
arms deal); Govt to Be Forced to Seek Apology for Incidents on DU Campus, BANGL. OBSERVER,
June 4, 2005, available at http://www.bangladeshobserveronline.com/new/2OO5/06/O4/ftont.htm
(reporting a Bangladeshi politician's call for a public apology for the government's alleged
involvement in killings on the campus of Dhaka University); Henin-Hardenne Cruises to
French Title, TSN.cA, June 4, 2005, available at http://www.tsn.ca/tennis/frenchopen/
news.story.asp?ID=126950&hubName=tennis-french open (reporting Mary Pierce's apol-
ogy to the French people for losing the 2005 French Open); Lapid Demands Apology for
Philippine Ambassador's Nazi Remarks, HAARETZ, June 4, 2005, available at http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jhtmlitemNo=584243 (reporting former Israeli Justice
MinisterJoseph Lapid's call for a public apology from the Philippine ambassador to Israel
1266
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The permutations of public apologies are many: Nations apolo-
gize to nations, groups to groups, individuals to collectives, collectives
to individuals, and occasionally governments to their people. 2 2 Public
apologies are played out on an open stage rather than, as in the case
of private apologies, behind the curtains of intimate relationships.23
As will be explored below, the rules of public apologies differ pro-
foundly from those of their private counterparts.24 But public apolo-
gies are no less powerful as a means of healing relationships. They
also convey important social messages and teach valuable public les-
sons that private apologies cannot.
In his recent book On Apology, psychiatrist Aaron Lazare suggests
that due to a growing understanding of their benefits, the incidence
of public apologies has exploded in the last fifteen years. 25 As evi-
dence, he identifies ht spate of public apologies, including Congress's
apologies to Japanese Americans interned during World War II, Presi-
dent Clinton's apology to African American victims of the Tuskegee
experiments, Senator Trent Lott's "serial apologies" for comments
supportive of segregation, counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke's
apology for his role in failing to prevent 9/11, and growing calls for
an official apology for slavery.26 One could add to this list the Sen-
ate's recent historic apology to African Americans for not acting
sooner to criminalize lynching.27 Citing a similar string of public
after he compared Israel's immigration police to the Nazis); Morgan Lee, Mexican Official
Issues Apology, BOSTON GLOBE, May 18, 2005, at A13 (reporting Mexican government offi-
cials public apology following President Vicente Fox's statement that Mexican immigrants
take jobs "not even" African Americans want); North Korea Demands U.S. Apology, CNN.coM,
June 2, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2OO5/US/O6/O2/northkorea.cheney (reporting North Ko-
rea's demand for an apology after Vice President Dick Cheney referred to North Korean
leader Kim Jong II as "one of the world's most irresponsible leaders").
22 See AARON LAzARE, ON APOLOGY 4-5, 7-15, 39 (2004) (discussing the growing im-
portance of public and private apologies in American culture).
23 See TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 70-71. Private apologies are interpersonal apologies
between individuals; the kind of apologies with which most of us are most familiar. These
apologies include run-of-the-mill apologies for things like being late and more consequent-
ial apologies such as being sorry for harsh words that damaged a personal relationship. We
know of the power, difficulty, and healing potential of such apologies from our own lived
experience. Most of us have fought with a loved one over who owes whom an apology. We
have felt the reparative effects of a sincere apology either given or received, and the sting
of another's refusal to offer an apology that we felt we deserved. And we have refused to
give apologies demanded, either because we felt we had done nothing wrong or because
we were reluctant to admit our fault. While we may intuitively understand that apologies
are called for when we hurt or inconvenience another, we also know firsthand that apolo-
gies can be painful to deliver, regardless of how wonderful they are to receive.
24 See infta Part IV.A.
25 LAz., supra note 22, at 1-21, 251.
26 Id. at 4-5, 51, 254.
27 See Avis Thomas-Lester, A Senate Apology for History on Lynching, WsH. POST, June
14, 2005, at A12 (reporting that by apologizing "the senators in essence admitted that their
predecessors' failure to act [to pass an anti-lynching law] had helped perpetuate a horror
that took the lives of more than 4,700 people from 1882 to 1968, most of them black men,"
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apologies, Roy Brooks, editor of When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Contro-
versy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice, has argued that
we have entered an "Age of Apology." 28 Whether or not Lazare and
Brooks are correct that public apologies are on the rise in the United
States, or whether they have always been as prevalent, public apologies
undoubtedly occupy a central role in resolving disputes in modern
American culture.
II
RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF APOLOGY IN THE LAW
The importance of apology has not been lost on legal scholars.
In the last ten years, an increasing number of scholars have discussed
the merits of incorporating apology into the criminal legal system.29
A number of "shaming" advocates have advanced forced apologies as
a cost-effective means of deterring crime, exacting retribution, and
reinforcing social norms.30 Other scholars have lauded the restorative
benefits of apology in healing psychic wounds.3 1 These proponents of
restorative justice have argued that the criminal process should be re-
structured to foster more opportunities for victims and offenders to
meet face-to-face, with the ultimate goal of encouraging genuine re-
morse and forgiveness.3 2
Meanwhile, some judges have taken to the idea of coerced apol-
ogy in criminal proceedings with gusto, using apology mostly as a
shaming mechanism.33 Reports abound in the media of judges re-
but noting that the apology resolution was signed by only eighty of the one hundred Sena-
tors, and that "[m]issing from that list were senators from the state that reported the most
lynching incidents: Mississippi Republicans Trent Lott and Thad Cochran").
28 Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CoTrrovERSY
OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 3 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
29 SeeJayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REv.
959 (1999); Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004); Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments
Educate, 65 U. CHI L. REv. 733 (1998); Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-
Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365
(1999); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean 7,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996);
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1880 (1991);
David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1811 (2001); James Q.
Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055 (1997).
30 See Kahan & Posner, supra note 29, at 367-68; Kahan, supra note 29, at 593; Skeel,
supra note 29, at 1814-17.
31 See, e.g., Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 29.
32 See id. at 130-34 (noting that victim-offender mediation programs "seem to leave
both victims and offenders more satisfied and better off').
33 See generally Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored To-
ward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REv. 289, 296-98 (2001) (describing several such reports
including one about an Ohio judge who ordered three men to publicly apologize for disor-
derly conduct during Oktoberfest celebrations and a Texas judge who ordered a teenager
to apologize to students for vandalizing their schools).
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quiring defendants to apologize as a condition of receiving probation
rather than incarceration. 34 Examples range from judges ordering
drunk drivers to take out newspaper ads with an apology to the com-
munity,35 to requiring batterers to apologize to their spouses before
women's groups, 36 to ordering corporate polluters to write letters of
apology for their environmental crimes and pay for newspaper adver-
tisements detailing their conduct. 37 When defendants refuse to coop-
erate in such coerced expressions of remorse they risk the wrath of
the court. For example, a federal judge in Hawaii recently sent a for-
mer city council-member back to prison, rather than to a halfway
house, after the former city council-member refused to apologize to
the community for misusing taxpayer funds.38 And a court in New
Hampshire recently ordered a man to undergo "empathy training"
after he failed to apologize as a condition of probation. 39 Similarly,
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, defendants who refuse to
apologize routinely serve sentences that are up to 35% longer than
those who do.4 0
Feeding on the growing prevalence of apology in criminal legal
scholarship and practice, scholars also have begun in the last several
years to advocate changes in the civil system to encourage apologies. 41
Several scholars point out that plaintiffs often want an apology above
all else, and only file a civil lawsuit when this desire is thwarted.42
These scholars argue that because the law treats apologies as admis-
sions of guilt, it inadvertently discourages apologies and encourages
34 See, e.g., id.
35 See Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 187
(2000).
36 See, e.g., Haya El Nasser, Paying for Crime with Shame: Judges Say "Scarlet Letter" Angle
Works, USA ToDAY, June 25, 1996, at Al; see also Thomas M. Antkowiak, Note, Truth as Right
and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 977, 1009-12
(2002) (noting several instances ofjudge-ordered apology in the context of a discussion of
the benefits of systematically incorporating restorative principles in the U.S. criminal jus-
tice system).
37 See Kahan & Posner, supra note 29, at 367 (citing Richard Phillips, Shame as a Deter-
rent, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1988, at C20).
38 See KITV News, The Hawaii Channel (ABC television broadcast May 16, 2005).
39 Alan J. Keays, Court: Man Must Work on Empathy Issues, RUTLAND HERALD, May 17,
2005, at B1.
40 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 29, at 93 n.19 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 3El.1, cmt. n.3 (2003) (authorizingjudges to consider defendants' accept-
ance of responsibility when determining sentences); see also United States v. Fagan, 162
F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The commentary to Section 3El.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines also indicates the Commission intended remorse to be a component of accept-
ance of responsibility."); United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 1994).
41 See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135
(2000) (discussing the benefits of apology in the context of civil mediation); Deborah L.
Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1165 (1997) (arguing for an
increased role for apology in dispute resolution).
42 See, e.g., Shuman, supra note 35, at 180.
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litigation. 43 They therefore propose rewriting the rules of evidence to
exclude certain apologetic statements.44 While some scholars criticize
such proposals as subverting apology,45 a number of states neverthe-
less have passed laws that exclude expressions of sympathy from evi-
dence. 46 Other scholars argue that because plaintiffs often value
expressions of remorse more than monetary compensation, defend-
ants should apologize as a cost-effective means of avoiding litigation,
promoting settlement, and mitigating damages. 47 Still other scholars
encourage mediation to facilitate apologetic discourse and forgiveness
in civil cases in much the same way those in the restorative justice
movement promote face-to-face meetings in the criminal context. 4
These scholars explain that plaintiffs often file lawsuits expecting to
receive apologies as part of the "therapeutic" process of litigation. 49
But, like PFLAG, most plaintiffs never receive apologies and are "seri-
ously disappointed. '50
Nevertheless, only a few scholars have touched on the appropri-
ateness of court-ordered apologies in civil cases. 5 1 The paucity of dis-
cussion on this issue is striking given that most of the arguments in
favor of forced apologies in the criminal system apply equally in the
civil context. For example, as in criminal cases, compelled apologies
in civil cases could play a critical role in healing psychological wounds,
reinforcing accepted norms, restoring social equilibrium, and deter-
ring future wrongdoing. 52 Moreover, whereas compelled apologies in
the criminal arena serve primarily to reinforce the existing social and
43 See Levi, supra note 41, at 1167.
44 See Shuman, supra note 35, at 188.
45 See Taft, supra note 41, at 1138 (arguing that the "strategic" use of apology to facili-
tate dispute resolution may undermine the moral quality of apology).
46 SeeJonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 819,
820 (2002) (noting that as of 2002 eight states were considering bills that would exclude
from admissibility apologetic expressions of sympathy); Shuman, supra note 35, at 188 (dis-
cussing Massachusetts evidence rules rendering inadmissible evidence related to "benevo-
lent gestures" to show liability in a civil action).
47 SeeJennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REv. 460, 463 (2003); Aviva Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist
Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect It, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 221 (1999).
48 See, e.g., Levi, supra note 41, at 1171.
49 See Shuman, supra note 35, at 185 (citing Nathalie Des Rosiers et al., Legal Compensa-
tion for Sexual Violence: Therapeutic Consequences and Consequences for the Judicial System, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 433 (1998)).
50 See id.
51 See Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1147 (noting that juries, if allowed, might
prefer to order apologies in addition to or in lieu of damages in some civil cases); Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 1, 50-57 (1997) (stating that court-ordered apologies should be but are not availa-
ble as an equitable remedy in civil cases); Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 487 (sug-
gesting that the civil legal system would be improved if apology were better incorporated).
52 See, e.g., LAZARE, supra note 22, at 44 (listing psychological needs that successful
apologies satisfy); see also TAvucmis, supra note 1, at 13; Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at
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political order, court-ordered apologies in the civil rights context
could serve a much more transformative function by helping to rede-
fine social norms and confirming the justice of important causes. 53
III
THE CASE FOR COURT-ORDERED APOLOGIES AS A CIVIL
RIGHTS REMEDY
In non-civil rights contexts, scholars have noted that many civil
claimants want apologies from defendants. 54 For example, up to 98%
of civil medical malpractice claimants desire apologies.55 And 37%
wouldn't have filed suit had the doctor fully explained and offered an
apology to begin with.56 Similarly, sexual assault victims often pursue
civil claims for therapeutic rather than financial reasons. 57 The "de-
sire to be heard, have their experience validated, and receive an apol-
ogy" are "important aspects of their therapeutic expectations for the
legal process. 58 Likewise, in another study, 75% of plaintiffs who
agreed to mediate civil claims identified apology as an important issue
for them in deciding to mediate. 59
While these studies have not focused on civil rights plaintiffs,
there's no reason to suspect that civil rights plaintiffs are any different
than other civil litigants in desiring apologies. Indeed, if my former
clients are any indication, civil rights plaintiffs may match medical
malpractice claimants in their desire for apologies. Excluding those
who suffered no personal injury but were challenging statutes, ordi-
nances, or general governmental policies, nearly every one of my cli-
ents wanted an apology, and many listed a public apology as the major
goal of settlement discussions. These clients included the gay families
1140-41 (noting that civil punishment is a means of restoring the value of equality);
Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 473, 492.
53 Haley, supra note 2, at 503 (discussing the socially transformative effect of apologies
related to pollution and drug-related injury cases in Japan in the 1970s).
54 See TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 3; Robbennolt, supra note 47, at 463 & n.12; see also
Des Rosiers et al., supra note 49; Amy B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physicians to
Handle Mistakes? A Survey of Internal Medicine Patients in an Academic Setting, 156 ARcHIVES OF
INTERNAL MED. 2565 (1996).
55 See Witman et al., supra note 54, at 2566.
56 See Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives
Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1612 (1994), cited in Robbennolt, supra note 47, at
463 n.12.
57 See Des Rosiers et al., supra note 49, at 443-44.
58 Shuman, supra note 35, at 185; see also Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79
B.U. L. REV. 663, 695 (1999) (citing Andrea Parrot, Recommendations for College Policies and
Procedures to Deal with Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 368
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991)) (explaining that most victims of acquain-
tance rape would prefer that their assailants know that what they did was wrong rather than
be arrested).
59 See Mark S. Umbreit, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND MEDIATION 22 (1994), cited in Bolstad, supra note 2, at 548-49.
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mentioned previously, the family of a man who died in prison due to
inadequate health care, and a thirteen-year-old girl strip-searched at
school. For each of these plaintiffs, receiving an apology was the moti-
vating factor in choosing to litigate. 60
Other civil rights attorneys and plaintiffs with whom I have spo-
ken echo this desire. For instance, when a Continental Airlines pilot
forced Michael Dasrath, a soft-spoken Indian American employee of
J.P. Morgan, and two other men of color off a plane on New Year's
Eve in 2001, Mr. Dasrath sought an apology from the pilot.61 Only
after the pilot and the airline repeatedly refused to apologize did Mr.
Dasrath file a civil rights claim in federal court "to make them ac-
knowledge that what they did was wrong."62 Over four-and-a-half
years later, Mr. Dasrath is still waiting for an apology, and he refuses to
settle without one. Mr. Dasrath explains, "I know for a fact it won't be
sincere at this point. I just want them to acknowledge what they did
was wrong. They may not believe it, but at least I could say I have it in
writing that [they] admitted that what [they] did was wrong."63
Despite the importance of apologies to civil rights plaintiffs, pub-
lic collectives rarely apologize when they violate moral or legal
norms. 64 As Nicholas Tavuchis explains in his sociological study of
apology, "Typically, individuals who have been ill used by collective
agencies must, when so disposed, exert considerable and sustained ef-
fort to receive an apology, no less material compensation when it is in
order, with little or no hope of success."65 While Tavuchis is correct
that both compensation and an apology can be hard to come by, he
60 See Shuman, supra note 35, at 183 (noting that a civil rights action over the Ohio
National Guard's killing of students at Kent State University during a protest of the Viet-
nam War did not settle until an apology was negotiated).
61 Interview with Michael Dasrath, in New York, N.Y. (June 23, 2005) (on file with
author). The airline pilot took this action after a white female passenger told the pilot that
the "brown men are behaving suspiciously." Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Sues Four Major
Airlines Over Discrimination Against Passengers (June 4, 2002), available at http://rww.
aclu.org/racia'ustice/racialprofiling/15867prs20020604.html. Though Mr. Dasrath had been
repeatedly searched and cleared to fly, and though his wife actually worked for Continental
Airlines, the pilot had him removed from the plane and asked that he be arrested. Instead,
Mr. Dasrath was placed on the next flight, without being required to undergo any addi-
tional security checks whatsoever, and his luggage was allowed to remain on the original
airplane. Since Mr. Dasrath's lawsuit is against Continental Airlines and not the govern-
ment, this Article does not propose that he should be able to pursue a court-ordered apol-
ogy. Rather, Mr. Dasrath's story is used to illustrate the motivations and desires of a typical
civil rights plaintiff.
62 Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
63 Id. While anecdotal, Mr. Dasrath's story illustrates in concrete terms what psycho-
logical literature already tells us about the importance of apology to many individuals who
have been injured.
64 See, e.g., TAvcUHs, supra note 1, at 92; see also Marquez, supra note 1 (reporting a
rare apology from the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department for damage caused to
several Compton homes when sheriffs fired 120 rounds at an unarmed driver).
65 TA uCHIS, supra note 1, at 93.
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incorrectly suggests that the two are equally elusive. Federal and state
civil rights statutes at least provide some mechanism for victims of gov-
ernmental abuse to secure monetary relief.66 But civil courts gener-
ally do not order apologies, 67 leaving victims of governmental abuse
who desire an apology without recourse.
As Professors Hiroshi Wagatsuma and Arthur Rosett explain in
their influential comparative study of apology in the Japanese and
American legal systems, 68 the failure of the American legal system to
do more to encourage apology deprives victims of an important mech-
anism to relieve psychic and status injuries that cannot be healed by
money alone:
The important point here is that while there are some injuries that
cannot be repaired just by saying you are sorry, there are others that
can only be repaired by an apology. Such injuries are the very ones
that most trouble American law. They include defamation, insult,
degradation, loss of status, and the emotional distress and disloca-
tion that accompany conflict. To the extent that a place may be
found for apology in the resolution of such conflicts, American law
would be enriched and better able to deal with the heart of what
brought the controversy to public attention. 69
A similar point has been made by other scholars, who have noted that
while material reparation is often "much less important than emo-
tional or symbolic reparation,"7 0 the American legal system is inade-
quately structured to provide the latter. 7'
A. Court-Ordered Apology and Psychological Healing
Commodified concepts of compensation may provide some mea-
sure of recompense for physical injuries, but they do little to redress
emotional and psychological wounds. 72 Apologies, on the other
66 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (providing for the liability of a party depriving
constitutional rights of another in an "action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress").
67 See Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1147 n.114 ("Civil jurors.., do not typically
have the ability to compel an apology from the defendant to the plaintiff."); Robert A.
Creo, Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1017, 1037 (2004) ("Civil
courts do not order apolog[ies] . . ").
68 Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 487.
69 Id.
70 John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian ?, 46
UCLA L. REv. 1727, 1744 (1999).
71 See Bolstad, supra note 2, at 545 ("The conspicuous absence of apology.., in Amer-
ican legal mechanisms[ ] constitutes a surprising failure given the importance of both
apology and forgiveness in Judeo-Christian culture.").
72 See, e.g., Antkowiak, supra note 36, at 1011 ("The enduring American emphasis on
monetary damages is a completely inadequate method of providing a true satisfaction to
victims."). As Mr. Dasrath put it, "Money doesn't matter to me. It's not about money. I'd
rather have an apology than money. I want them to know it was wrong." Interview with
Michael Dasrath, supra note 61; see asoJeffrey Berryman, Reconceptualizing Aggravated Dam-
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hand, can be quite effective in helping plaintiffs heal. "[S]uccessful
apologies heal because they satisfy at least one-and sometimes sev-
eral-distinct psychological needs" of victims. 73 These needs include
restoring self-respect and dignity, assuring victims that the offense
wasn't their fault, allowing victims to feel secure that the offense won't
happen again, validating the victims' experience, and evening the
score.
7 4
First, apologies help victims regain their sense of self-worth and
dignity, both of which are essential aspects of psychological well-be-
ing. 75 When an individual is slighted, insulted, or otherwise mis-
treated, he or she typically feels humiliated and devalued. 76 For
example, Mr. Dasrath explained that when the pilot forced him off
the plane, "it was belittling, very belittling. I was embarrassed, angry,
and confused. How could they associate me with terrorists who would
kill thousands of human beings? I was in New York on 9/11. I saw it.
I felt it. I could smell it in the air. I don't want to be lumped in with
terrorists. '77 As Mr. Dasrath's comment suggests, individuals who
have been devalued and belittled experience a variety of psychological
distresses, including anxiety, anger, and powerlessness. Some experi-
ence self-loathing for having "let" themselves become victims of such
mistreatment. 78
Apologies facilitate recovery from this psychological distress by re-
storing the victim's dignity through a symbolic transfer of humiliation
and power between the offender and victim. 79 By apologizing, offend-
ers admit to being immoral, insensitive, or mistaken. And as anyone
who has ever offered a difficult apology can attest, such an admission
of guilt can be humiliating. In addition, the offender, having origi-
ages: Recognizing the Dignitary Interest and Referential Loss, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1521,
1549-50 (2004) (concluding that the ideal of "complete compensation" includes dignitary
damages and noting that apologies may assume a greater role in achieving complete com-
pensation); Taft, supra note 41, at 1136-37 (discussing a widow's anger at not having re-
ceived an apology after her husband died due to medical malpractice).
73 [AZARE, supra note 22, at 44.
74 See id.
75 See id. at 45.
76 See Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
77 Id. The emotions expressed by Mr. Dasrath are similar to those expressed by a
British pilot of Arab origin who was imprisoned for five months in London due to the FBI's
false allegation that he helped plan 9/11. After being released for lack of evidence, the
pilot protested, "'My family doesn't deserve to be labeled as terrorists and I didn't deserve
five months in prison.'" LAZARE, supra note 22, at 51. He sought an apology from the
United States Department of Justice, which, not surprisingly, it refused to provide. "The
man wanted his dignity restored and was willing to accept an apology as the mode of that
restoration. However, when the government refused to apologize, he was forced to seek a
different remedy." Id.
78 See id. at 58.
79 See id. at 45-53 (discussing restoration of self-respect and dignity as one way in
which apologies heal damaged relationships).
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nally abused his or her power in hurting the victim, is placed in the
vulnerable position of giving the victim the power to absolve the
wrongdoing or not to do so. 80 While a compelled apology works
somewhat differently, as the offender may not care about being ab-
solved, the victim still has the power to accept or reject the apology.8 1
Moreover, the exchange of humiliation may be even more pro-
nounced because the offender is forced to admit his faults publicly.8 2
"This exchange of humiliation and power between the offender and
the offended may be the clearest way of explaining how some apolo-
gies heal by restoring dignity and self-respect. '83
Second, compelled apologies can be effective in assuring victims
that they are not at fault. In searching for an explanation for why they
were singled out for mistreatment, victims often turn inward and won-
der if they were somehow to blame.84 A compelled apology corrects
for this tendency by apportioning responsibility where it belongs. The
need for this type of reassurance is especially important in cases of
sexual abuse-including abuse by state officials. 85 David Shuman ex-
80 See id. at 52.
81 Victims can sometimes heighten their superiority over the offender by accepting
the apology. Consider, for example, First Lady Laura Bush's gracious acceptance of Teresa
Heinz Kerry's apology for incorrectly stating that the First Lady had never held a "real job."
Mrs. Bush replied, "She didn't have to apologize. I know how tough it is. And actually I
know those trick questions." See Laura Bush Brushes Aside Heinz Keny's Remarks, CNN.coM,
Oct. 21, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2OO4/ALLPOLITICS/1O/21/laura.teresa. The effect of
this apologetic exchange was to confirm Mrs. Bush's status as a very likeable First Lady. It
also called into question Heinz Kerry's acceptability to replace her.
82 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 38-42 (comparing public and private apologies noting
that public apologies are those between individuals in the presence of a broader
audience).
83 Id. at 52; see also Des Rosiers et al., supra note 49, at 444 (explaining that in the
sexual violence context, "the [litigation] process often has symbolic meaning for the survi-
vor, who may seek to reclaim, in a protected environment, the power that she lost to the
aggressor"). The ability of an apology to facilitate the healing process has been explained
by equity theorists. See, e.g., Elaine Walster et al., New Directions In Equity Research, 25 J.
PERSONALTrrv & SOC. PSYCHOL. 151, 156, 163 (1973). Equity theory posits that whenever
individuals find themselves in unequal relationships, they become emotionally distressed.
But the symbolic exchange of humiliation and power can rebalance the relationship and
restore equity. The restoration of equity in turn helps eliminate the psychological distress.
See id. at 156, 163.
84 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 58. For example, Mr. Dasrath stated, "People think I
should just take it. Their attorney asked me in the deposition, don't you think you should
accept that stuff like this is going to happen given the need to be cautious about terror-
ism?" Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
While Mr. Dasrath feels strongly that "it's not right," my interpretation is that he needs
to hear confirmation that he doesn't have to endure such mistreatment and that he isn't
being selfish by complaining about bearing the brunt of the "war on terror."
85 See LAzARE, supra note 22, at 58-59 (discussing the value to two sisters of an apology
from the Vermont Social and Rehabilitation Department for "failing to protect them from
being repeatedly raped by their stepfather," and noting one sister's statement that the
apology was about "getting over the feeling that I was the bad girl").
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plains the therapeutic value of apology in helping victims avoid self-
blame:
By explaining to the victim that he or she did not cause what hap-
pened (i.e., attributing responsibility for the harm externally rather
than internally), apology, like fault based liability determinations,
may serve as a moral gyroscope clarifying responsibility for harm.
The apology tells the victim, "It wasn't your fault," avoiding miscon-
strued self-blame or criticism. 8 6
Third, compelled apologies may help victims feel safer by cor-
recting the notion that they deserved to be mistreated.8 7 Offenders,
who also feel psychological distress when they mistreat others, often
attempt to relieve their discomfort by justifying their mistreatment of
the victims, both to themselves and to others. 88 If left uncorrected,
these justifications can be unsettling to victims because they signal
that the offender is likely to repeat the offense:
[T] he victim must realize that the harm-doer is likely to justify the
victim's suffering. This is not a pleasant prospect. The exploiter's
justifications are potentially dangerous to the victim. The harm-
doer who justifies his actions will end up with a distorted and unreal
assessment of his actions. If he distorts the extent to which the vic-
tim deserved to be hurt, for example, or minimizes the victim's suf-
fering as a consequence of the act, he may commit further acts
based on these distortions. When a harm-doer uses the justification
technique, then the victim is left in sad straits. Not only has he been
hurt, but the probability has increased that he will be hurt again.89
Victims, who intuitively understand the danger of the offender's un-
checked rationalizations, need the offenders to know that their ac-
tions were indefensible.9 0 Apologies serve this function, because part
of an apology is admitting that there was no excuse for one's behavior.
While a voluntary apology is obviously superior in assuring the victim
that the offender realizes his actions were unjustified, even a com-
pelled apology can help the victim feel safer in knowing that the of-
fender is at least somewhat less likely to use the same rationale as an
excuse for hurting her in the future.9 1
86 Shuman, supra note 35, at 183.
87 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 60 (noting that apologies "restore a sense of control
over physical and psychological safety to the offended parties").
88 See, e.g., Walster et al., supra note 83, at 162.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 104. As Mr. Dasrath explained, "I realize that they feel it's justified. They
just don't get it. And if they don't get it, they're gonna keep doing it." Interview with
Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
91 See, e.g., LAZARE, supra note 22, at 60. But cf ELAINE PINDERHUGHES, UNDERSTANDING
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POWER: THE KEY TO EFFICACv IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (1989) (sug-
gesting that long-term cultural mistreatment can lead to the perpetuation of feelings of
defensiveness even when the risk is diminished or removed).
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For example, when the City and County of Honolulu excluded
PFLAG from the Family Day Parade, it justified its actions by claiming
that gays might dress in sexually suggestive costumes inappropriate for
a family event. The underlying message was that discriminating
against gays is acceptable because they are sexual deviants. The televi-
sion media lent credence to this suggestion by repeatedly flashing
images of gays in risqu6 costumes worn as part of a Gay Pride Parade,
as if PLAG members would dress the same for a family event. Simi-
larly, the Hawaii Christian Coalition, with whom the City co-sponsored
the parade, defended its actions by maintaining that homosexuality
was unnatural and that only traditional families belonged in the
parade.92 To the extent the City failed to disavow these justifications
for discrimination, gays and lesbians can assume that the City and
those who follow its example will continue to discriminate on the basis
of similar rationales. By contrast, a compelled apology would have
forced the City to renounce any rationale for excluding gay families
from the parade. This in turn would have helped gays and lesbians
feel safer in knowing that the City was less likely to publicly espouse or
act upon such justifications in the future.
Fourth, compelled apologies help victims heal by validating their
experiences. 93 By publicly apologizing, the offender tells a narrative
in which he or she committed a wrong that harmed the victim and for
which the offender owes the victim an apology:
[A] call for an apology entails, among other things, a description or
documentation of the material facts and attendant circumstances of
the offense. In this recounting, moreover, the offender comments
about what occurred. In these terms, an apology attests to, vali-
dates, confirms, records, and also objectifies-to the extent that
what it refers to is "objective" for all concerned parties-truth or an
accurate view of social reality.94
In apologetic discourse, the "victim is assured that the offender,
and sometimes a broader audience, knows the nature of the of-
fense . . . . [T]he victim [also] receives validation that the offense
really happened, that he or she did not distort reality or memory."95
92 See Gima, ACLUFiles Suit, supra note 6 (reporting the director of the Hawaii Chris-
tian Coalition's opinion that the parade was about having role models for children and
that he did not "believe the gay lifestyle fits that description").
93 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 67 (citing Martha Minow, Truth Commissions, in BE-
TWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGWENESS 68 (1998) (quoting a commissioner of the United Na-
tions Truth Commission for El Salvador stating that for victims, "the mere act of telling
what had happened was a healing emotional release, and that they were more interested in
recounting their story and being heard than in retribution")); see also Robbennolt et al.,
supra note 2, at 1141 (explaining that tort plaintiffs care as much about "a chance to 'tell
their story,' as about the actual monetary outcomes at stake").
94 TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 57.
95 LAZARE, supra note 22, at 68.
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A public apology, compelled or not, thus validates the victim's emo-
tional pain and offers an avenue for cathartic healing.9 6 When the
offender finally acknowledges the suffering of the victim, the victim
can begin to move on.
Finally, compelled apologies can satisfy the need of some victims
to see offenders suffer.9 7 Though perhaps not the loftiest desire, vic-
tims sometimes need to feel that the score is even.98 Thus, victims
often feel better knowing that the offender also suffered by having to
apologize and accept responsibility for her inappropriate behavior.99
B. Court-Ordered Apology and the Promotion of Social Justice
Legal remedies serve an expressive function. 100 When a court or-
ders a defendant to pay damages to a plaintiff or to modify certain
policies or practices, the court sends a message about what is and isn't
acceptable behavior. This power of a court order to convey a message
is its "expressive utility."101 But not all court orders have equal expres-
sive value. For example, consider the case where a court finds that a
municipality violated protesters' speech rights but awards only nomi-
nal damages because the protestors did not suffer any economic
loss. 102 The message of such a decision is ambiguous at best, and con-
tradicts core constitutional values at worst. While the court may have
found that the municipality violated an important constitutional right,
awarding only nominal damages leaves the distinct impression that
the municipality's actions weren't all that serious and didn't cause any
96 Id. (noting "the many ways in which the victims' participation in the [apologetic]
dialogue... has a healing or therapeutic impact" and how the opportunity for the victim
to tell his story "results in a kind of catharsis").
97 See, e.g., id.
98 Id.
99 See Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1139 (arguing that one of the benefits of an
apology is that "the victim may experience some retributive justice in seeing the offender
suffer through stating the offense").
100 See, e.g., Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1131 ("Another class of goals that may
influence legal decisions is related to the expressive functions such decisions can serve.
The law functions expressively to the extent that its role is more symbolic than instrumen-
tal, as it focuses on 'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly.").
101 Kahan & Posner, supra note 29, at 380 (defining "expressive utility" as the power of
a punishment to "convey desired social meanings").
102 See, e.g., Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (holding
that "damages based on the abstract 'value' or 'importance' of constitutional rights are not
a permissible element of compensatory damages in [§ 1983] cases," and thus, regardless of
the importance of the right at issue, courts cannot award more than nominal damages
when there has been no actual injury); see also California Protesters Win Pepper Spray Lawsuit,
FREE REPUBLIc, Apr. 29, 2005, http://ww.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1393865/posts (report-
ing that ajury awarded eight plaintiffs $1 each when "[1]aw enforcement officers from two
northern California counties were found liable Thursday for using excessive force by swab-
bing pepper spray in the eyes of logging protesters in 1997").
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"actual" harm.1 0 3 The court inadvertently sends the message that vio-
lating constitutional rights is merely a technical violation.
In contrast, if a municipality were ordered to apologize publicly
when it violated citizens' rights, the message would be far less equivo-
cal. The expressive utility of apology has been recognized by a variety
of scholars. Janet Holmes explains: "'[B]y observing what people
apologize for, we learn what cultural expectations are with respect to
what people owe one another' and we also learn 'about the rights and
obligations that members of a community have toward one an-
other .... "-104 Jennifer Robbennolt suggests that "while offering an
apology may not be the best mechanism by which to achieve compen-
sation, it may be a better mechanism by which to express the proper
relative moral positions of the parties than is a monetary award."' 05
Stephanos Bibas and Richard Bierschbach note that "[a]pology, ex-
pressions of remorse, and other mea culpas are secular remedial ritu-
als. They both teach and reconcile by reaffirming societal norms and
vindicating victims. '10 6 And Dan Kahan and Eric Posner laud the
power of forced apologies "to express publicly valued social mean-
ings."10 7 In short, due to their high expressive utility, apologies-both
voluntary and forced-offer a powerful alternative to commodified
compensation, and can be an effective means of sending messages
about acceptable behavior and desired social norms.
Plaintiffs' attorneys frequently implore juries to "send a message"
by imposing large punitive damages on unrepentant offenders. Juries
sometimes respond to such appeals with disproportionately large ver-
dicts. The efficacy of using punitive damages to send messages, how-
ever, is limited. Punitive damages are not available against the state,
local, or federal government, or against officials acting in their official
capacities. l0 8 Additionally, rather than send the message that the de-
103 See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310; see also Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573 (1992)
("[T]he basic purpose of a § 1983 damages award should be to compensate persons for
injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. For this reason, no compensa-
tory damages may be awarded in a § 1983 suit absent proof of actual injury." (citations
omitted)); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 8.11, at 516 (2d ed. 1991) (con-
cluding that "it seems clearly established [from cases such as Stachura] that recovery of
damages under § 1983 is limited to compensation for actual injuries suffered"); Mark Mor-
rell, Who Wants Nominal Damages Anyway?: The Impact of an Automatic Entitlement to Nominal
Damages Under § 1983, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 225, 228 (2001).
104 Janet Holmes, Sex Differences and Apologies: One Aspect of Communicative Competence, 10
APPLIED LINGUISTICS 194, 210 (1989) (quoting Nessa Wolfson, The Bulge: A Theory of Speech
Behaviour and Social Distance, in SECOND LANGUAGE DISCOURSE: A TEXTBOOK OF RESEARCH
(Jonathan Fine ed., 1988)).
105 Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1147.
106 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 29, at 113.
107 Kahan & Posner, supra note 29, at 365.
108 See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that




fendant engaged in deplorable behavior, disproportionately large ver-
dicts often send the unintended message that the civil system has run
amok-that it unjustly enriches some individuals at the rest of our
expense. This message does little more than lend support to those
who advocate limits on damages.
Were juries allowed to order defendants to apologize, some of
the "pressure to convert all damages into dollars" might be re-
lieved. 10 9 Juries could then fashion awards that both adequately com-
pensated victims and expressed their moral outrage and sympathy for
the victims without calling into question the legitimacy of our entire
system of civil compensation. While some might object that court-or-
dered apologies let defendants off easy, victims value apologies and
frequently settle for lower monetary damages if defendants agree to
apologize.' 10 Likewise, defendants often will pay substantially more in
damages rather than admit wrongdoing.11'
As a valued component of dispute resolution, apologizing is not
equivalent to getting off scot-free. Imagine, for example, that in addi-
tion to being ordered to pay a reasonable amount of damages to the
now infamous eighty-one-year-old woman who suffered third-degree
bums from its coffee,1 12 McDonald's had been ordered to post a pub-
lic apology in its restaurants. Such an apology, among other things,
would necessarily acknowledge that although McDonald's knew that
over 700 people had suffered serious bums from its coffee,' 13 McDon-
ald's chose to do nothing about it because a statistician found that the
number of hot-coffee burns was statistically insignificant compared
with the amount of coffee sold. 114 One could guess that McDonald's
might rather pay a significant amount of money than apologize be-
cause an apology might cost more than monetary damages alone.
One could also surmise that such an apology would send the message
the jury intended to convey more effectively than its $2.9 million
award to just one woman, who has become a symbol for tort reform
and the butt of late-night-television jokes.
While this example concerns a hypothetical corporate apology, a
compelled apology would work similarly with a governmental actor in
a civil rights case. It's particularly important to set the public record
109 Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 488.
110 See Shuman, supra note 35, at 180 (noting that tort plaintiffs often claim that an
apology "was the most valuable part of the settlement"); Bolstad, supra note 2, at 551 (relat-
ing the story of a Dalkon Shield plaintiff who explained that for the company to "apologize
to me ... would be worth millions").
111 See Shuman, supra note 35, at 180-85.
112 See, e.g., Andrea Gerlin, A Matter of Degree: How a jury Decided That a Coffee Spill Is
Worth $2.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
113 See id.
114 See id. (reporting an expert's statement at trial that McDonald's sells 1 billion cups
of coffee per year).
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straight and place moral responsibility where it belongs when the gov-
ernment commits a moral or legal wrong:
Municipalities are capable of wrongful and even reprehensible acts,
and when they engage in such acts, it is important to place the re-
sponsibility, and indeed the stigma, where it belongs. To do so
holds the entity responsible for the public meaning of its actions,
affirms the importance of the rights at stake and puts the moral
onus where it belongs-upon those who collectively failed to avoid
abusing the public trust.1 15
This is so because moral-and immoral-messages sent by the
government, the "omni-present teacher" of morality,1 16 have particu-
lar resonance:
How "uniquely amiss" it would be... if the government itself-"the
social organ to which all in our society look for the promotion of
liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy
norms and goals for social conduct"-were permitted to disavow lia-
bility for the injury it has begotten. 117
Compelled apologies, more than perhaps any other legal remedy,
require the government to face its wrongs squarely and accept public
responsibility for violating legal norms. Under the current system,
when the government is ordered to pay substantial damages or make
significant policy changes, it contests the validity of the court's order
and vows to appeal-whether or not it ever does-and never accepts
public responsibility for its actions. A compelled apology, on the
other hand, would require the government to recognize its wrongdo-
ing publicly. Even if the government tried to disavow the apology, the
public message would have been sent. The very fact of apology sends
the unequivocal message that the government committed a wrong.
And as even a child who has been forced to apologize knows, the
moral script of apology, once enacted, can hardly be taken back.
Compelled apologies not only have the power to reinforce moral
and legal norms, they could also transform those norms. As societal
notions of right and wrong evolve, abuses previously ignored orjusti-
fied are properly recognized as human injustices. 1 18 Apologies could
115 Susan Bandes, Not Enough Blame to Go Around: Reflections on Requiring Purposeful Gov-
ernment Conduct, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1195, 1211 (2003).
116 See id. at 1210 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting)).
117 Id. (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980)).
118 In The Age of Apology, Roy Brooks lists a number of human injustices that are deserv-
ing of apology:
[T]he violation or suppression of human rights or fundamental freedoms
recognized by international law, including but not limited to genocide; slav-
ery; extrajudicial killings; torture and other cruel or degrading treatment;
arbitrary detention; rape; the denial of due process of law; forced refugee
movements; the deprivation of a means of subsistence; the denial of univer-
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serve as barometers and agents of this social change. 1 9 When govern-
ments apologize for past injustices, they acknowledge these evolving
norms and establish a new social contract. 120 For example, recent
apologies made by the U.S. government-to Japanese Americans for
internment during World War II, to native Hawaiians for forcefully
annexing Hawaii, and to African Americans for failing to criminalize
lynching until 1968-reflect the fact that there is "an evolving social
contract that expands to include the rights and needs of these
groups."'12 1 Furthermore, these apologies indicate that "formerly pow-
erless groups are now demanding respect and denouncing behaviors
that devalue them."122
Additionally, when social minorities or excluded groups pursue
litigation to raise awareness of social injustice, compelled apologies
force governmental actors to recognize the validity of the plaintiffs
cause. For example, in Japan, where a compelled apology is an availa-
ble legal remedy, plaintiffs pursue apologies as a means of redefining
social norms: 123
The plaintiffs in the pollution and drug-related lawsuits did not seek
apologies by the government or the defendant firms as a means of
maintaining the status quo or preserving social harmony. They in-
stead demanded apologies as a recognition of redefined social
norms and as an act of submission to a shifting hierarchical order.
The apologies acknowledged the legitimacy of protest and protes-
ters. With an altered moral and social authority thereby confirmed,
the lawsuits were more important in forcing the apology than in
sal suffrage; and discrimination, distinction, exclusion, or preference based
on race, sex, descent, religion, or other identifying factor with the purpose
or effect of impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, social,
economic, cultural, or any other field of public life. In sum, a human injus-
tice is simply the violation or suppression of human rights or fundamental
freedoms recognized by international law.
Brooks, supra note 28, at 7. This list encompasses a wide range of acts that would also
violate rights and freedoms recognized by state and federal laws in the United States.
119 See TAvuCHIS, supra note 1, at 13.
120 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 181 ("The last group of apologies includes those moti-
vated by a new understanding or a new application of an ethical ideal, who perhaps see for
the first time that their actions violate an important moral value."); see also TAvuCHIS, supra
note 1, at 13 ("As symbolic barometers, apologies register tensions and displacements in
personal and public belief systems, that is, the contraction and expansion of interdictory
motifs-what calls for an apology and what does not-that either precede or follow
changes in social behavior and cultural expectations.").
121 TAvuCHIS, supra note 1, at 13. Elizabeth Rush argues that an apology for slavery
would serve a similar function, by confirming the accepted societal consensus that slavery
was immoral and a blight on our country's history, as well as reinforcing the notion, still
contested by some, that because the effects of slavery continue today, the government
should act to redress continuing inequality. Rush, supra note 51, at 51-52.
122 LAZARE, supra note 22, at 55.
123 Haley, supra note 2, at 503.
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modifying the legal rules on negligence or proof of causation or the
damage awards. These lawsuits of the 1970s accordingly marked a
turning point for postwar Japan, a shift in social values and the po-
litical order in which, I believe, apology played a role.
1 2 4
While references to Japan inevitably invite protests that Japan is too
culturally different for the United States to learn from, such objec-
tions "buttress a false sense of immutability of culture and obscure
important parallels." 125 As previously discussed,1 2 6 Americans have a
deep-seated interest in apology, and like plaintiffs in Japan, those in
the United States often pursue litigation as a means of fostering social
change.
For instance, PFLAG's battle with the City of Honolulu seeking
an apology for the City's exclusion of gay families from the Family Day
parade was essentially a contest over the evolving definition of a "fam-
ily."' 12 7 One version of the apology sought by PFLAG read: "The City
and County of Honolulu sincerely regrets excluding gay and lesbian
families from the Family Day parade. Despite any message to the con-
trary conveyed by our actions, the City and County of Honolulu values
all families, including gay and lesbian ones."'1 28 A later version read
simply: "The City and County of Honolulu regrets that gay and lesbian
families were excluded from the Family Day parade.1 29 The City re-
jected even this empathetic statement, because it still defined "family"
to include lesbian and gay families. 130 Given the particularly strong
influence of the Christian Coalition on Honolulu's mayor at the time,
the City would not even agree that lesbians and gays could form fami-
lies, much less agree to apologize for excluding them.
A court-ordered apology to PFLAG would have sent two impor-
tant messages: First, gays and lesbians can form families; second, it's
wrong to discriminate against gays and lesbians. While a declaratory
judgment might have served a similar function, an apology has signifi-
cantly more expressive utility. As legal jargon, a declaratory judgment
124 Id. at 503-04.
125 Id. at 503. Comparing our legal system with others provides "examples of different
ways of dealing with common social problems." Hilary K. Josephs, The Remedy of Apology in
Comparative and International Law: Self-Healing and Reconciliation, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 53,
54 (2004) (citingJOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
AMERICA, AND EAST AsIA 1 (1994)). Due to its cultural traditions, Japan is a particularly
helpful reference because its legal system frequently comes up with different answers than
the U.S. legal system does. On the other hand, 'Japan is one of few prosperous democra-
cies in Asia with a legal system that functions on a high level of professionalism and incor-
ruptibility. Second, Japan's legal system is perhaps the only one in Asia that legal scholars
classify as truly 'Western,' squarely within one of its recognized lineages." Id. at 56.
126 See supra Part I.






often conveys little more to the public than who won the case. 131 Apol-
ogies, on the other hand, are culturally embedded moral signifiers
that convey clear messages of right and wrong, ones that even young
children are taught to understand. 13 2
Beginning as children, people learn apologies as moral scripts,
enacted time and again, whenever one person harms another. 13 3
Apologies thus have special educational value:
While a sincere apology is the ideal, we shouldn't underestimate the
educational value of a formal apology, whether or not we believe it
to be sincere. Parents routinely tell their misbehaving children to
"say you're sorry," without any real hope of sincerity. Why? Because
the exercise itself teaches a valuable lesson. The emphasis in apol-
ogy rituals can be as much on the ritual as on the apology. When
we violate a rule of social intercourse and have no excuse orjustifi-
cation for our conduct, the proper response is to accept responsibil-
ity for our actions and to try to make amends, if only by making a
simple apology.13 4
This pedagogic arrangement need not consist of a parent and
children, but can be recreated whenever an authority figure certifies
"an offense as apologizable," directs the offender to apologize, and
"appraises matters of form and timing." 135 In the pedagogy of apol-
ogy, the authority figure apprises the wrongdoer of "the distinction
between accountable and unaccountable actions," alerts the offender
"to the existence of an offense gradient or standard of severity," and
admonishes the wrongdoer "for conduct that specifically calls for an
131 For example, in 1999, the ACLU of Hawaii challenged an ordinance banning street
performers from Kalakaua Avenue, the main pedestrian thoroughfare in Waikiki. The
ACLU sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The court eventually issued a decision
granting both. The media, however, reported only that street performers could continue
to perform in Waikiki, with no explanation of the court's decision or the First Amendment
rights at stake. See David Waite, Waikiki Performers' Show Will Go On, HONOLULU ADVERTISER,
Dec. 29, 2001, at Al. On the other hand, if the City had been ordered to apologize for
violating the speech rights of street performers, the press would very likely have reported
the apology. Such an apology would have had much greater expressive value than a declar-
atory judgment read by only a few interested individuals. See generally Stanley Ingber, Re-
thinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772, 835 (1985) ("Even
declaratoryjudgments... are inadequate [in the defamation context]. Often they cannot
restore the injured party's reputation in the community because they are insufficiently
publicized, especially in comparison with the defamatory statement.").
132 See TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 64.
133 See id.; see also Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 29, at 143 ("The very act of apologiz-
ing teaches, which explains why parents make their children apologize (grudgingly) for
hitting a sibling or taking a toy. In other words, the ordeal of expressing remorse and
apologizing, even if done initially for the wrong reasons, may in time promote genuine
repentance.").
134 Garvey, supra note 29, at 792-93 (citations omitted).
135 TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 50-51.
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expression of remorse, in lieu of, or in addition to, other forms of
restitution." 36
In other words, much as a parent educates a child, a court can
teach the offender, the victim, and the broader social audience valua-
ble lessons about right and wrong by requiring offenders to apolo-
gize. 137 For example, if courts required police departments to
apologize publicly every time they engaged in or encouraged racial
profiling, each time the police department enacted the apologetic
script, the wrongfulness of racial targeting would become more in-
grained in the public psyche. The continuing failure of police depart-
ments to acknowledge or apologize for racial profiling signals that
African Americans and other people of color are inherently suspect
and are worthy of neither equal treatment nor an apology when mis-
treated.1 38 A court-ordered apology could counteract this destructive
message by condemning such discrimination.
C. Court-Ordered Apology and the Restoration of Social
Equilibrium
In addition to conveying important social messages, public apolo-
gies would help to heal ruptured social relations and restore social
equilibrium. t 39 Just as being mistreated causes victims to feel deval-
ued, the offense also sends a public message that those like the victim
are less valuable than others. 140 This message distorts social equilib-
rium to the extent that it contradicts accepted or desired notions of
equality. The disruptive effect is especially pronounced when entire
groups of people are diminished by the offense. In such cases, public
anger, particularly among the offended group, can create or exacer-
bate public instability. 141
136 TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 65.
137 Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 29, at 143.
138 See, e.g., Greg Bonnell, Eastern Ontario Cops Release Study Disputing Allegations of Racial
Profiling, CANADIAN PaRss, June 7, 2005 (reporting an Ontario Police Association spokesper-
son's statement that calls for an apology for racial profiling were "unfounded and
premature").
139 SeeRobbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1144-47; id. at 1147 ("[If civil decision mak-
ers were allowed to compel an apology as part of their verdict, they might choose to do so
as a better way by which to restore equity.").
140 Mr. Dasrath explained that part of the reason he wants an apology is to send a
message that it's unacceptable to treat people of color the way he was treated:
I want to help other people like me, Indians, so it doesn't happen to them.
People shouldn't have to worry that they are going to get treated like that.
I've seen it happen to other people. It makes you anxious every time you
fly. When they're searching us, they're actually looking for something, not
like with a white person. It just feels different.
Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
141 For an example of both the public instability caused by offenses that diminish
groups and the power of an apology to restore social equilibrium, consider a reported
incident involving former Supreme Court nominee Harriet Miers. SeeJo Becker, The Right
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Unfortunately, aside from a few well-publicized cases, the modus
operandi for most governmental organizations, particularly police de-
partments, has been to deny wrongdoing and steadfastly refuse to
apologize. 142 Moreover, even in rare cases where governments do of-
fer apologies, they are often phrased passively and carefully crafted by
lawyers as statements of regret rather than real apologies that accept
responsibility and acknowledge the extent of the harm caused.1 43 The
cumulative effect of the government repeatedly denying responsibility
and refusing to offer apologies can devalue whole communities and
seriously disrupt social stability.
Another message sent by public officials who refuse to apologize
is that "those who hold real positions of power in society need not
humiliate themselves by apologizing."'144 The result can be a palpable
sense of powerlessness among individuals and groups that are treated
with disrespect by governmental actors, but are unable to secure even
symbolic redress. As explained earlier, court-ordered apologies would
work in part by enacting a symbolic exchange of humiliation and
power between the offender and victim. 145 By providing this redress,
court-ordered apologies could set visible limits on abuse of power by
government officials and could help ensure a proper balance between
the government and the public.
D. Court-Ordered Apology as Inducement for Changed
Behavior
A number of shaming advocates have seized upon forced apolo-
gies and other shaming penalties as a means of changing individual
Result was Key to Miers, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2005, at Al. When Miers was a member of the
Dallas City Council, the city was on edge after a series of police shootings that killed inno-
cent African American men. In the wake of the shootings, an African American county
commissioner was arrested after an altercation with a white off-duty police officer who
called him a racist name. More than 1,000 demonstrators marched on City Hall and many
feared violence. Harriet Miers grabbed a microphone and said, "If it means anything to
you, I want to apologize.... I want to apologize to the African American community of
this city for an unprovoked and unexcusable [sic] attack on one of their elected leaders."
Id. Reportedly, her apology met with applause from the crowd and played a key role in
defusing the tension. See id.
142 But see, e.g., Marquez, supra note 1. Publicized exceptions include police officers
apologizing in Boston for killing a twenty-one-year-old woman with rubber bullets while
trying to subdue a rowdy fan after the Red Sox won the World Series, in Philadelphia for
arresting and handcuffing a ten-year-old girl who came to school with scissors in her
backpack, and in Los Angeles for indiscriminately firing 120 bullets at an unarmed suspect,
damaging the homes and risking the lives of members of the predominately African Ameri-
can community. See id.
143 See id. (noting that the apology by the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department
was not expected to prompt severe repercussions in any potential lawsuits because it was
carefully worded as an expression of sympathy, not an admission of guilt").
144 Bolstad, supra note 2, at 563.
145 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
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behavior.' 46 These scholars implicitly rely on the cognitive dissonance
theory of social psychology. 147 At the risk of oversimplifying a com-
plex and controversial theory, cognitive dissonance theory maintains
that individuals have a psychological need for their cognitions-which
include beliefs, feelings, and actions-to be consonant with each
other.1 48 If such consonance is lacking, individuals experience psy-
chological discomfort and are motivated to bring their cognitions
back into congruence. Thus, when individuals' actions are out of line
with their beliefs or feelings, they will either change their actions or
adjust their beliefs and feelings to regain cognitive congruence.1 49
According to this theory, individuals will either harm others out
of a prior belief that such behavior is acceptable or seek to justify their
behavior ex post by developing beliefs and feelings congruent with
their actions. 150 This often consists of devaluing the harmed individ-
ual as deserving of mistreatment; it could also consist of minimizing
the harm caused or the offender's role in causing the harm. For in-
stance, the movie Bully tells the true story of the killing of high school
student Bobby Kent by a group of his peers. 151 The group first de-
cides that Kent deserves to die because he is a bully and a rapist. Out
of this anger, the group plan the murder and then converges on Kent,
stabbing him repeatedly and beating him with a baseball bat. Almost
immediately after the murder, each participant seeks to minimize his
146 See Garvey, supra note 29, at 751 ("(P]ublicity and its potentially attendant shame
can deter wrongdoing in three ways. First, they impose . . .some limitation on the of-
fender's freedom .... Second, and more importantly, they produce (if they work) an
unpleasant emotional experience for the offender, which potential offenders will want to
avoid and actual offenders will want to avoid repeating. Third, depending on the nature of
his communal attachments, he may suffer adverse consequences from members of the
community, who may gossip about him or refuse to engage in various forms of social and
economic intercourse with him." (citations omitted)); Kahan & Posner, supra note 29, at
377 ("Shaming penalties and other sorts of sanctions can, in theory, be used to change
beliefs as well as behavior .. "); Sharon Lamb, The Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying
Emotions and Their Symbolic Expression in Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 929,
955 (2003) ("[W]e hope [the act of apologizing] will influence [criminals] .. "); Latif,
supra note 33, at 313 ("[A]n ordered apology can deter future transgressions."). But see
Massaro, supra note 29, at 1933-34 ("At best, [shaming sanctions] are likely to prove futile,
even silly, responses to crime. At worst, they may become highly destructive, state-imposed
assaults on human personality.").
147 See, e.g., Kahan & Posner, supra note 29, at 377 (stating that the authors have used
the cognitive dissonance theory of Leon Festinger, see LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COc-
NITnE DISSONANCE (1957), in an "impressionistic way").
148 See, e.g., Eddie Harmon-Jones &Judson Mills, An Introduction to Cognitive Dissonance
Theory and an Overview of Current Perspectives on the Theory, in COGNITVE DISSONANCE: PRO-




151 BULLY (Lions Gate Releasing 2001). For a literary portrayal of the Bobby Kent
story, see JIM SCHUTZE, BULLY: A TRUE STORY OF HIGH SCHOOL REVENGE (1997).
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or her role. One protests that "all" he did was stab Kent once in the
back of the neck, and that the knife "only went in a few inches."1 52
Another 'just" helped throw him face down into a canal after he was
probably dead already. 153 Another merely watched.1 54
Throughout the movie, one can see the process of cognitive ne-
gotiation at work. The feeling comes first: The high school students
hate Kent because he has abused them, and they want to see him die.
The students then have to justify murdering him by developing a be-
lief that he deserves it. Only then can they act. When the act creates
unexpected feelings of guilt, they minimize their guilt by downplaying
their actions and then develop the belief that they are being prose-
cuted unjustly.
The story has been simplified here to illustrate how a change in
one's belief, feeling, or action can have a ripple effect on the other
two and how this process of interaction among cognitions is ongoing.
The story also illustrates what cognitive dissonance theorists have
shown in experiments: that by deliberately manipulating one cogni-
tion, it's sometimes possible to cause other cognitions to adjust.1 55
For example, when researchers induced individuals to make state-
ments they did not believe by threatening punishment or offering re-
wards, the researchers observed that these individuals would adjust
their beliefs and feelings to correspond with what they were required
to say. 156 In other words, from a theoretical standpoint, being com-
pelled to apologize for wrongdoing without feeling sorry could be a
first step in cognitively acknowledging wrongdoing and in adjusting
one's future actions and attitudes to conform to this new belief.157
Shaming advocates rely heavily on this theory in advancing forced
apologies.' 5 For example, Katherine Baker suggests that college date
rapists should be forced to stand in front of classrooms and apologize
as a way of understanding the wrongfulness of date rape:
If these men were forced to apologize for what they did, if they were
forced to articulate how rape carelessly used women, they might be-




155 See Harmon-Jones & Mills, supra note 148, at 4-5; Leon Festinger & James M. Carl-
smith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203
(1959) (discussing the effects on a person's private opinion of being forced to do or say
something contrary to that opinion).
156 See, e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, supra note 155, at 203. This process is known by
cognitive psychologists as the induced-compliance paradigm. See Harmon-Jones & Mills,
supra note 148, at 8-10.
157 See, e.g., Latif, supra note 33, at 314.
158 See Baker, supra note 58, at 704 (discussing the efficacy of forced apologies in the
context of date rape).
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twice before having another beer when they have to drive home.
Apologizing forces people to admit their wrongdoing in a way that
criminal punishments often do not. 1
59
Similar rationales underlie punishments such as forcing drunk drivers
to publish apologies in local newspapers, wife batterers to apologize in
front of women's groups, and racists to apologize to African American
congregations for burning down their churches. 160 Moreover, anec-
dotal and empirical evidence suggests that forced apologies some-
times do produce the desired change in beliefs and attitudes. 161
Several important caveats are in order, however. First, one
counterargument to the induced-compliance paradigm posits that
while some offenders might respond to forced apologies by coming to
terms with the wrongfulness of their actions and changing their belief
systems, others might respond by hardening their positions and elevat-
ing their resistance through either overt or covert actions. 162 For ex-
ample, a physically abusive prison guard might respond to forced
apology by heightening the psychological abuse of prisoners, whom
the guard now holds responsible for his public humiliation. An indi-
vidual's response to forced apology thus might depend largely on per-
sonality, including any sociopathic tendencies the individual may
harbor. Since courts are not experts in psychology, ordering offend-
ers to apologize in hopes of favorable behavioral changes could be
risky.163
Second, it's overly simplistic to think that changing someone's
beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors is as easy as forcing them to apologize.
Apart from individual personality characteristics, the effect of a com-
pelled apology will depend on the dissonance ratio-in other words,
the quality and quantity of other cognitions pushing in the opposite
direction. 164 To draw on Baker's example, if a date rapist's support
system consistently tells him that women say no when they mean yes,
159 Id.
160 See Antkowiak, supra note 36, at 1012 (discussing a Texas federal court's decision to
force wife batterers to apologize to their spouses in front of women's groups); Latif, supra
note 33, at 312 (discussing a Kentuckyjudge who forced white defendants to apologize for
arson of a church founded by freed slaves to the church's congregation); Shuman, supra
note 35, at 187 (discussing an Illinois judge who forced drunk drivers to publish apologies
in local newspapers).
161 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 29, at 143; Garvey, supra note 29; Lamb, supra
note 144, at 955; Kahan & Posner, supra note 29, at 377; Latif, supra note 33, at 314; Shu-
man, supra note 35, at 187.
162 See Harmon-Jones & Mills, supra note 148, at 8-10. See generallyJEAN-LEON BEAuvois
& ROBERT-VINCENT JOULE, A RADICAL DissoNANCE THEORY 73-97 (1996) (examining behav-
ioral ramifications of forced compliance).
163 See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 29, at 1920-21 (highlighting the dangers of requiring
judges to predict offenders' susceptibility to shame and likely post-shaming behavior).
164 See generally Harmon-Jones & Mills, supra note 148, at 28-40 (discussing cognitions
and their role in the context of dissonance theory).
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and rewards him with praise for his sexual conquests, a forced apology
would probably not change his beliefs, attitudes, or actions. 165 Addi-
tionally, other internal cognitions-including the desire for self-affir-
mation and self-consistency-push the individual to deny doing
anything wrong.166 The likelihood that a forced apology will help
change behavior depends largely on the resistance to change created
by these and other countervailing external and internal forces.
Third, moral development and educational theory suggest that
the only way to effect consistent behavioral change is by encouraging
autonomous moral reasoning, wherein wrongdoers come to appreci-
ate the wrongfulness of their actions more or less of their own ac-
cord-though external input is certainly part of the process. 167 In
contrast, individuals who apologize only when told to are operating at
Kohlberg's "pre-conventional level" or Gilligan's "self-interested stage"
of moral development, which refer to the level of moral development
of an average seven-year-old. 168 Individuals at the pre-conventional or
self-interested stage have not developed the capacity for moral reason-
ing based on the importance of respecting conventional social norms,
honoring higher ethical principles, or fulfilling relational responsibili-
ties. 169 Rather, they are simply responding to the threat of punish-
ment or the promise of reward without any principled understanding
of why the authority figure is asking them to behave in a certain
way. 70 In the context of forced apology, such an individual might
refrain from the behavior that precipitated the forced apology as long
as the threat level was high enough. As soon as the authority figures
were out of the picture, however, he might revert to the harmful be-
havior. Thus, to the extent that the court is dealing with an individual
stuck at the pre-conventional or self-interested stage of moral develop-
ment, a forced apology is unlikely to create much long-term behav-
ioral change.
One way to partially alleviate some of these concerns might be to
adopt a version of a "woodshed" proceeding advocated by Jayne Bar-
nard.17 1 Barnard suggests that courts could compel CEOs and other
165 See Baker, supra note 58, at 704.
166 See, e.g., BFAuvois & JOULE, supra note 162, at 58-60.
167 See Carol Gilligan & Jane Attanuci, Two Moral Orientations: Gender Differences and
Similarities, 34 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 223 (1988); see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENr
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 27 (1993).
168 See Lester A. Lefton, Child Development, in PSYCHOLOGY 349-50 (2000) (discussing
Kohlberg's three-tiered model of moral development); see also GILLIGAN, supra note 167, at
27.
169 See Lefton, supra note 168, at 348-50.
170 See id.
171 See Barnard, supra note 29, at 965 (advocating a woodshedding process, wherein "a
wrongdoer admits his misconduct, recognizes its social significance, pledges corrective ac-
1290 [Vol. 91:1261
COURT-ORDERED APOLOGIES
corporate offenders to appear in court for a public woodshedding. 172
During this proceeding, through a dialogue with the judge, the CEO
would come to understand and be forced to articulate why the given
act was wrong, what went wrong within the corporation that allowed it
to happen, and what could be done to prevent it in the future. 173 This
type of proceeding would encourage autonomous moral reasoning by
requiring participants to "attend to the moral claims"'174 and "embrace
and internalize their communities' behavioral norms."175
A similar proceeding could be used with governmental actors. As
an addition to Barnard's proposal, plaintiffs could be invited to par-
ticipate, give impact statements, and engage in a conversation with the
offender.' 76 While plaintiffs could choose whether to participate, the
government offender would be compelled to do so by court order.
The chance for dialogue and for hearing directly about the offense's
impact on the plaintiff might increase the chance of attitudinal and
behavioral change. 177
Additionally, whereas a court-ordered apology might not change
the behavior of an individual defendant, institutional defendants
might be a different matter altogether. Shaming scholars have argued
persuasively that shaming sanctions, including forced apologies, can
serve as effective deterrents against corporate wrongdoing. 178 In a
highly regarded study of corporate response to public censure, Profes-
sors John Braithwaite and Brent Fisse found that being forced to ac-
knowledge wrongdoing publicly can play an important part in
tion, and is welcomed back.., into the community of law-abiding citizens, in the context
of corporate crime").
172 See id. at 973-74.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 974 (quoting JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 9
(1989)).
175 Id.
176 When asked how he would feel about such a proceeding, Mr. Dasrath replied:
I'd really like that. I'd like to tell them how it felt. But I also want to hear
from them. Ask them what they were thinking. Would they have done this
if I were white? Do they think everyone who is white is in the Klan? I'd like
them to understand that what they did was wrong. 'Cause I don't think
they get it.
Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61. Cf LAzARE, supra note 22, at 69 (suggesting
that victim impact statements made in the presence of criminal offenders help victims heal
by giving voice to their pain).
177 See Barnard, supra note 29, at 974.
178 Cf id., supra note 29, at 966-72 (observing that in the reputation-conscious corpo-
rate world, shaming penalties could be useful deterrents); Garvey, supra note 29, at 786
("[S]haming penalties tend to attract a good deal of media publicity, and so awareness of
an offender's wrongdoing usually reaches a wider audience than it otherwise would.");




inducing organizational change. 179 For example, after receiving sig-
nificant negative publicity for criminal acts, companies in the study
improved internal compliance mechanisms, implemented new train-
ing and educational programs for employees, and, in some cases, re-
structured their organization "from the top to the bottom of the
corporate hierarchy."' 80
Despite differences between corporations and governmental
agencies, there are also important similarities, including a common
institutional desire to avoid negative publicity. Theoretically, this sim-
ilarity should make compelled apologies an effective means of encour-
aging governmental change. Yet without additional information on
the actual effects of publicity on governmental agencies, one can only
make an educated guess that court-ordered apologies would be an ef-
fective means of inducing organizational reform. 81 Moreover, nega-
tive publicity works most effectively to induce institutional change
insofar as the governmental entity violates accepted social or moral
norms-by abusing and sexually assaulting young children in custody,
for example.'8 2 But negative publicity is less effective as a sanction-
and may in fact be completely ineffective-when a majority of the
population seems to agree with the wrongful act, such as with the ra-
cial profiling of "Arab-looking" men at airports. 18 3
These caveats are not intended to undercut the value of com-
pelled apologies. Rather, they are intended to suggest that courts
must carefully tailor court-ordered apologies to aid victims' psycholog-
ical healing processes and should design compelled apologies to con-
vey important social or moral messages to the broader social
audience, rather than to teach offenders by shaming them. Shaming
179 See BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE OF-
FENDERS 233 (1983) (noting the behavior-influencing "sting" of negative publicity for cor-
porations through "loss of corporate prestige, loss of prestige in the community for top
management, trauma for executives in facing cross-examination about the scandal, distrac-
tion of top management from normal duties, and decline in employee morale").
180 Barnard, supra note 29, at 1006.
181 See generally Bandes, supra note 115, at 1209 ("There is far too little nuanced infor-
mation on the ways in which governmental entities make decisions, and the sorts of incen-
tives, legal or otherwise, that would best promote accountability.").
182 Compare Richard Borreca, Reported Abuse of Teens Prompts Probe of Lockup, HONOLULU
STAR-BULL., Aug. 27, 2003, at Al (reporting Hawaii Governor Linda Lingle's replacement
of top management at the Hawaii Youth Correctional Facility), and Rod Ohlra, Youth Facil-
ity Investigated, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Aug. 27, 2003, at Al (reporting same), with Lynda
Arakawa, Youth Prison Reform Initiated, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 7, 2004, at B3 (reporting
the formation of the Hawaii Juvenile Justice Project, whose mission was to change condi-
tions at the youth correctional facility and create alternatives to youth incarceration).
183 A Gallup Poll taken after 9/11 found that as many as 60% of Americans supported
racial profiling of Arabs at airports. See Kari Lyderson, What Next, Concentration Camps?
Racial Profiling in the War on Terrorism, IMPACT PRESS, Feb. 2003, available at http://www.
impactpress.com/articles/febmarO3/racialpro2303.html (describing the widespread prac-
tice and acceptance of racial profiling despite lawsuits by the ACLU and others).
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penalties get things wrong by focusing on what will most degrade the
offender while ignoring the needs of victims. If, on the other hand, it
so happens that a compelled apology designed to heal the victim, pro-
mote an important moral value, and restore social equilibrium also
happens to change the offender's attitude and behavior-as it very
well might-so much the better.
IV
ANTICIPATED OBJECTIONS TO COURT-ORDERED APOLOGIES AS
A CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
There are, of course, a few likely objections to court-ordered
apologies that deserve discussion, some of which have arisen in the
context of forced apologies in criminal proceedings. First, some
scholars have argued that court-ordered apologies are ineffective be-
cause apologies must be sincere to be of any real value to victims. 184
Others contend that regardless of the value of apologies, forcing indi-
viduals to apologize is cruel because it causes the apologizer psycho-
logical pain. 185 Still others have argued that the First Amendment
would bar any use of court-ordered apologies in civil cases, 186 or that a
compelled apology is not an appropriate equitable remedy. 187 Finally,
some have suggested that court-ordered apologies would lose their
value over time due to the law of diminishing returns.188 This Part
addresses each of these objections in turn.
A. The Sincerity Objection
Many legal scholars have argued against compelled apologies in
criminal cases and against strategic apologies in civil cases by asserting
that an insincere apology is worthless. 189 One of most influential ad-
vocates of this objection is ethicist Lee Taft, of the Harvard Divinity
School. In Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, Taft argues
that when civil defendants make apologies either under the protec-
tion of statutes that exclude them from admission as evidence or as a
"strategic device[]" to settle lawsuits, the apology loses its moral
dimension:
When lawyers, legislators, judges, and mediators disrupt this [moral
dialectic] process by viewing apology in utilitarian terms, they sub-
184 See Bolstad, supra note 2, at 549; Cohen, supra note 46, at 849; Taft, supra note 41, at
1156-58.
185 See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 29, at 1942-43.
186 See, e.g., Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1147 n.114.
187 See infra Part IV.D.
188 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 29, at 1864.
189 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 117-19 (acknowledging that while apologies ideally
will be sincere, they need not be in order to be effective); see also Bolstad, supra note 2, at
549; Cohen, supra note 46, at 849; Taft, supra note 41, at 1156-58.
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vert the moral potential of apology in the legal arena. When the
performer of apology is protected from the consequences of the
performance through carefully crafted statements and legislative di-
rectives, the moral thrust of apology is lost. The potential for mean-
ingful healing through apologetic discourse is lost when the moral
component of the syllogistic process in which apology is situated is
erased for strategic reasons. 190
To Taft, an insincere apology isn't just a "moral wrong"; it's valueless:
"The lawyer must know the markers of authentic apology. .... This is
important for the plaintiffs lawyer so that his client is not duped into
trading his resentment for the defendant's gain."19 1
Taft's argument is essentially theological: He likens the moral dia-
lectic of secular apology and forgiveness to the religious act of repen-
tance and absolution, where authenticity, remorse, and sorrow are
necessary preconditions to the success of the ritual.' 9 2 Inside the
arena of interpersonal apology, Taft's argument has merit. But like
many legal scholars, he fails to recognize important differences be-
tween public and private apologies. While the two follow a similar
basic structure-acknowledgment of the offense, expression of re-
morse, reparations, and a promise of forbearance-their salient char-
acteristics differ profoundly. 193
Private apologies at heart are personal moral acts of repentance
meant to restore a damaged relationship by securing the forgiveness
of the other party. 19 4 As we know from our personal lives, private
apologies are most effective when they are sincere. When we are hurt
by others, particularly by those about whom we care deeply, we need
to know that they understand why we are hurt, that they truly regret
having caused us to suffer, and that they will try to avoid doing so in
the future. When offered an apology that we sense is insincere, we are
inclined to reject the apology and heighten our demand that the of-
fender acknowledge our suffering and offer a sincere apology. The
sincerity of the emotion, rather than the exact words, matters most. 19 5
Private apologies can be nonverbal, such as giving flowers to convey: "I
190 Taft, supra note 41, at 1157.
191 Id. at 1159. Ironically, despite his central theme that apology has been commodi-
fled, this quotation suggests that Taft has no problem with commodifying a client's resent-
ment, which the lawyer should trade for valuable compensation rather than an inauthentic
apology.
192 Taft establishes this framework from the beginning of his article, where he observes
that "apology is valuable because it offers the offender a vehicle for expressing repentance
and the offended an opportunity to forgive." Id. at 1138. Throughout his article, Taft
describes apology as an act of repentance. See, e.g., id. at 1139-41, 1144.
193 See LAzARE, supra note 22, at 39-40 (discussing similarities and differences between
public and private apologies); see id. at 117-19 (arguing that apologies need not be sincere
to be effective); see also TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 70-71.
194 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 229-33.
195 See id. at 37, 117-19.
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was wrong, please forgive me. ' 19 6 As long as the emotion of sincere
regret is expressed in a manner that's understood by the parties in-
volved, the apology serves its purpose, no matter what an onlooker
might have understood. 197
In contrast, it's imperative that the general audience understand
a public apology. 198 Thus, a public apology must be unambiguous.
The overriding interest in public apology is "to put the apology 'on
record,' that is, to extract a public, chronicled recantation that re-
stores those aspects of the collectivity's [or individual's] integrity and
honor called into question by the offense." 199 If a public apology ac-
complishes this goal, the question of sincerity is superfluous. As op-
posed to private apologies, which are characterized by spontaneity
and emotionality, public apologies are often carefully scripted, written
by third parties, negotiated, and offered only after considerable pres-
sure has been brought to bear.200 Because the "sole raison d'etre [of
public apology] is the record," sorrow is "ruled out or . . .perfunc-
tory . . "201 Rather, the message of the apology as a performative
utterance takes center stage. "[The] public record is the apologetic
fact. '202 This difference between a collective apology and an interper-
sonal one changes "the very idea of apology."20 3
Taft misses, or obscures, this point. He repeatedly cites Tavuchis
and Lazare for the proposition that "sociologists and psychologists
agree that an apology must have as its centerpiece 'an expression of
sorrow and regret,"' 204 but he selectively takes both authors out of
context. He generalizes their explanations of the role of sincerity and
remorse in interpersonal apologies and applies them to all apologies.
In doing so, he misunderstands the nature of public apology:
The function of apology... has little, if anything, to do with sorrow
or sincerity but rather with putting things on a public record.
This ... is collective apology's distinctive capacity, its ordinary lim-
its, and the ultimate source of its power to remedy and conciliate, if
not completely to heal. Thus to demand more of the form is to
mistake its task and logic. 20 5
196 See id. at 35-38 (discussing several anecdotes illustrating the efficacy of brief or
nonverbal apologies).
197 See id. at 37, 117-19.
198 See TAvucHis, supra note 1, at 71.
199 Id.
200 See LAzARE, supra note 22, at 39-40, 204-06.
201 TAvucHIs, supra note 1, at 102, 104.
202 Id. at 102.
203 Id. at 104.
204 Taft, supra note 41, at 1140 (quoting TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 23).
205 TAvucHIs, supra note 1, at 117. Tavuchis elaborates:
[T]he major structural requirement and ultimate task of collective apolo-
getic speech is to put things on the record, to document as a prelude to
reconciliation. And what goes on record .. .does not necessarily express
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Indeed, even private apologies made strategically without actual
remorse, sorrow, or shame can be effective as long as they satisfy the
needs of the victim:
[I]n order to be successful, an apology must meet the needs of the
offended party, such as the restoration of dignity, acknowledgement
of shared values, reparations, and the like. To believe that a "prag-
matic" apology is somehow less truthful or less effective than a more
impassioned one is to value style over substance, as if we believe that
the manner in which an apology is delivered is more important that
[sic] the goals it seeks to achieve .... As long as an apology meets
important psychological needs of the offended, or, by being public,
it reestablishes harmony and reaffirms important social values, we
should not diminish its effectiveness by becoming critics. 20 6
Taft and others who argue that only a sincere apology will do
ignore the fact that plaintiffs value apologies that they know are less
than sincere. Plaintiffs understand that when someone apologizes, he
or she is likely to have some level of internal dissonance. 20 7 Still,
plaintiffs like to hear defendants say they're sorry, and sometimes feel
satisfaction in seeing a defendant make an apology that she did not
want to make. Additionally, plaintiffs accept negotiated apologies as
valuable and treasured parts of settlements, even when they know that
the apology is insincere. 20 8 While this might make Taft "shudder,"
suggesting that plaintiffs are being "duped" insults their intelligence
and neglects something very real about human experience. 20 9 This
experience tells us that an insincere apology can sometimes be better
than no apology at all, because it at least says what we need to hear.
Somehow, mysteriously, this makes us feel better. For instance, when
asked how he would feel about a court-ordered apology, Mr. Dasrath
replied, "I know it wouldn't be sincere. But it's better than nothing.
I'd take it."210
B. The Cruelty Objection
A second common objection to compelled apologies is that, be-
cause apologizing against one's will can cause psychological anguish,
sorrow and, except in a pro forma fashion, need not in order to effect rec-
onciliation between collectivities. It is the latter function, then, that is the
singular and significant achievement of collective apology.
Id. at 109.
206 LAzARE, supra note 22, at 157-58.
207 See, e.g., Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 477, 495.
208 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 29, at 143 ("[V]ictims may find even half-
hearted apologies satisfying.... This explains why victims negotiate for confessions and
apologies as part of settlements or plea bargains, even though the apology is an obvious
quid pro quo.").
209 Taft, supra note 41, at 1156, 1159.
210 See Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
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forcing someone to apologize is cruel and inhumane. 21' Scholars who
make this argument typically do so in the context of forced apologies
used as shaming mechanisms such as requiring defendants to wear
signs around their necks and stand on the sidewalk, making sex of-
fenders put signs in their front yards, and forcing drunk drivers to
place their pictures in the newspaper alongside an apology.212 Such
degradation ceremonies are meant to "strike at an offender's psycho-
logical core." 213 Scholars who object to such practices are exactly
right: There is something deeply disturbing about allowing a court to
seek out and degrade a person's psychological core.214
This Article does not propose compelled apologies as a means of
shaming individual government offenders. Rather, it proposes victim-
centered apologies in which victims help craft the apology to say what
they most need to hear or to convey certain social or moral messages.
To the extent that courts craft apologies to help victims-not to maxi-
mize offender humiliation-many of the concerns about the cruelty
of compelled apologies can be avoided. Additionally, in the context
of official apologies, the apology might, but won't always, come from
the individual offender. For example, as will be discussed below,
when a police officer abuses a suspect, the apology could come from
the police chief as the representative of the police department rather
than from the individual officer. 21 5 In other cases, the apology could
be posted on a city bus, billboard, or Web site-without any specific
individual having to utter a word.
Even in cases where a court orders an individual official to apolo-
gize for wrongdoing, however, concerns about the official's discom-
fort should be put into proper perspective. To be sure, apologizing,
voluntarily or not, can be psychologically painful. But being excluded
from a city-sponsored parade because of your sexual orientation, or
raped by a prison guard, or strip-searched and humiliated by a school
principal, are even more painful. Requiring unrepentant officials to
endure a small amount of psychological discomfort is a small price to
pay to help injured individuals get the apology that they need to begin
to put their lives back together.
211 See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 29, at 1942-43 ("When a shame sanction hits home, it
is a direct assault on a basic need of all people, the esteem of others.").
212 See id. at 1881-82.
213 Id. at 1920.
214 See id.
215 See infra Part V.B.
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C. First Amendment Concerns
A third common objection to court-ordered apologies is that they
violate the First Amendment. 21 6 The First Amendment guarantees
not only the right to speak, but also the right not to speak.2 17 While
the Supreme Court originally grounded this negative speech right-
known as the compelled speech doctrine-in the right to freedom of
thought and conscience, 21 8 it eventually expanded the doctrine to in-
clude the right to refrain from stating an objective fact.2 19 This right
extends not only to individuals, as one would expect if the right were
grounded in freedom of conscience or thought, but also to corpora-
tions,2 20 which lack a conscience or the capacity for thought.
While there's good reason to question the wisdom both of un-
mooring the compelled speech doctrine from its grounding in rights
of conscience, and of extending negative speech rights to corpora-
tions, a critique of the Court's current construction of the compelled
speech doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article. 22 1 It's sufficient to
note that the Court's current construction presents a considerable
practical and theoretical barrier to the use of court-ordered apologies
as a general remedy in all civil cases. 222 As will be discussed below, an
216 See, e.g., Robbennolt et al., supra note 2, at 1147 n.114 ("The First Amendment
raises potential obstacles to compelled apologies in civil cases."). The First Amendment
does not generally present a barrier to compelled apologies in the criminal context, how-
ever, because trial courts have broad discretion to impose probation conditions, including
conditions that significantly burden First Amendment rights. For a discussion and critique
of this deferential standard of review, see Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judi-
cial Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WAsH. &
LEE L. REv. 75, 114 (2000) (noting the dearth of research into the efficacy of shaming
sentences and the fact that judges are increasingly imposing them despite expert theories
that "shaming is either totally ineffective or counter-productive as a response to criminal-
ity"); Phaedra Athena O'Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of First
Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L.
Rev. 783 (1999) (discussing the constitutionality of scarlet-letter probation conditions on
grounds that such conditions compel probationers to speak).
217 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("[T]he right of freedom of thought .. .against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.").
218 See id.
219 See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 782 (1988) (holding that
the First Amendment draws no distinction between compelled statements of opinion and
compelled statements of fact, because either form of compulsion burdens protected
speech).
220 See Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
221 See generally Nicholas Nesgos, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Com-
mission: The Right to Hear in Corporate Negative and Affirmative Speech, 73 CORNELL L. REv.
1080 (1988) (arguing that the Pacific Gas Court incorrectly expanded negative speech
rights to corporations); David W. Ogden, Is There a First Amendment "Right to Remain Silent?":
The Supreme Court's "Compelled Speech" Doctrine, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368 (1993) (arguing
that negative speech rights should be moored in rights of conscience).
222 This barrier stems from the fact that when compelling an individual to apologize,
the court is necessarily concerned with the content of the speech. See United States v.
1298
2006] COURT-ORDERED APOLOGIES 1299
apology ideally contains a statement of remorse, an acknowledgment
of responsibility, and a promise of forbearance.22 3 Because such state-
ments strike at the heart of an individual's conscience, ordering an
individual to apologize raises core First Amendment concerns. 22 4
But these First Amendment concerns do not arise in compelling
state actors to apologize, which is the proposal made in this Article.
It's true, of course, that any speech by a governmental entity must be
conveyed through an agent. If a court compelled a municipality to
apologize, it would effectively be compelling an individual to apolo-
gize on the municipality's behalf. Alternatively, a court might directly
United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 410-411 (2001); Hurley v. Irish-Amer. Gay Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995); Riley, 487 U.S. at 795; Pac. Gas & Electric, 475
U.S. at 8-18. As opposed to content-neutral burdens on speech, which need only survive
an intermediate level of scrutiny, content-based burdens on speech are subject to strict
scrutiny. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573; Riley, 487 U.S. at 498. Strict scrutiny requires that the
restriction be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest-other-
wise known as the "least restrictive alternative" analysis-and almost always spells death for
the speech limitation at issue. See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 460 (2005).
223 See infra Section V.A. Cf LAzARE, supra note 22, at 38; Shuman, supra note 35, at
185.
224 As a practical matter, the government regularly forces individuals to speak, such as
when filling out tax forms or signing up for the draft. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 216, at 858.
The difference, of course, is that filling out tax forms or draft cards merely requires an
individual to report objective facts accurately, while a forced apology requires a moral
statement. It would seem that the government's interest in requiring an individual to re-
port facts need not be as strong as its interest in requiring an individual to state opinions or
beliefs. In other words, the greater the burden on core First Amendment rights, the more
compelling the government interest must be. This sliding scale would suggest that in cases
in which an apology was the only remedy that could make a severely injured plaintiff
whole, a court might be justified in ordering an individual civil defendant to apologize.
Additionally, the government interest might not need to be as compelling in ordering
corporate defendants to apologize, because corporations lack the capacity for thought. See
Choi, supra note 2, at 207.
Regardless, this Article leaves such First Amendment questions for another day. In-
stead, it focuses on the benefits of court-ordered apologies because court-ordered apolo-
gies offer the greatest promise as a remedy in civil rights case against state actors. For cases
discussing First Amendment concerns with apologies in non-civil rights cases, see Matchett
v. Chi. Bar Ass'n, 467 N.E.2d 271, 275 (Ill. App. Ct. May 17, 1984) (dismissing a complaint
that sought publication of a response, a retraction, or an apology, holding that the defen-
dant could not be compelled to "publish information it has chosen not to publish"), cert.
denied, Matchett v. Chi. Bar Ass'n, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Tackett v. KRIV-TV, No. H-93-3699,
1994 WL 591637, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. May 5, 1994) (granting a Rule 12(b) (6) motion in a
defamation action seeking a retraction and apology); Griffith v. Smith, No. LT-460-2, 1993
WL 945995, at *13 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar 4, 1993) ("First Amendment concerns preclude the
Court from ordering the apology originally suggested .. "), rev'd on other grounds, Roberts
v. Clarke, No. 930781, 1994 WL 16011491 (Va. May 06, 1994). But see Kicklighter v. Evans
County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 719 (S.D. Ga. 1997) ("[T]o require a simple apology
for truculent and disruptive in-school behavior falls well within the ambit of an institution's
balanced comprehensive authority. If the school board can determine what manner of
speech is inappropriate in the classroom, it can also dictate what speech is proper when
fulfilling its charge to inculcate the habits and manners of civility . (citations and
quotations omitted)).
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compel an official to apologize.2 25 While such public officials have a
First Amendment right to speak, or not, on matters of public con-
cern,226 these rights can be constrained to promote legitimate govern-
ment interests in ensuring the proper functioning of public
agencies.227 Governmental employees and agents are not "autono-
mous persons at liberty to act according to their own moral lights but
occupants of institutionally designated offices or positions whose func-
tions are defined and circumscribed by collective goals and
interests."228
Individual government officials have a right not to make state-
ments against their personal beliefs or interests in their private lives.
But as agents of public collectives carrying out official functions, their
official actions and speech may be constrained-and dictated-by
public goals and policies. 22 9 Suppose, for example, that a municipal
fire chief conveyed a public message that Arab-Americans were not
welcome to apply for positions as firefighters. Were a court to find, as
it should, that such a message violates the Equal Protection Clause,
the court could use its equitable power to require the fire chief to
cease conveying this discriminatory message and instead issue a public
statement that the city welcomed applications from those of all ethnic-
ities, including Arab Americans. The fire chief could not hide behind
the First Amendment by claiming such a statement was personally of-
fensive to him. Likewise, if the court ordered the fire chief to include
in that statement an apology to Arab Americans for discriminating
against them, he could not object on First Amendment grounds. The
First Amendment simply does not bar a court or legislative body from
directing public officials to make certain public statements in carrying
out their official duties.230
225 While the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits against states without their con-
sent, see U.S. CONST. art. XI, it does not bar suits against state officials for injunctive relief.
See, e.g., 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 101 (2005) ("An action in federal court under 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983 against a state official in his official capacity, which seeks only declaratory
or injunctive relief, is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment as such actions are not
treated as actions against the state." (citations omitted)).
226 See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 477 (2005); Mike Harper, Note,
Connick v. Myers and the First Amendment Rights of Public Employees, 16 HASTINGS COMM. &
Er. LJ. 525, 527-29 (1994) (discussing the Court's four-part test, see Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138 (1983), for determining whether a public employer's sanctions of an em-
ployee for expression receives First Amendment scrutiny).
227 See, e.g., 63C Am,. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 477 (2005) ("[T]o trigger
First Amendment protection, the speech at issue must relate to matters of public interest,
and the employee's interest in First Amendment expression must outweigh the employer's
interest in efficient operation of the workplace.").
228 TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 100.
229 See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 477 (1997); Harper, supra note
226, at 527-29.
230 See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Public Officers and Employees § 477 (1997).
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D. Compelled Apology as an Appropriate Equitable Remedy
A fourth concern with court-ordered apologies is whether they
constitute appropriate equitable relief under state and federal civil
rights statutes.231 The few courts that have considered this question
have done so in the context of state civil rights statutes and have
reached divergent conclusions. 232 For example, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota overturned an order that required two police officers to
write letters of apology to an African American boy whom they had
assaulted while using racially derogatory language. 233 The court rea-
soned that the legislature had intended affirmative relief in civil rights
cases to remedy the lingering effects of discrimination, and that writ-
ing an apology letter is "calculated to humiliate and debase its writer
and will succeed in producing only his resentment-an emotion not
particularly conducive to the advancement of human rights."234 Like-
wise, a Pennsylvania court overturned an order by the State Human
Relations Committee directing the owner of a cemetery to write a let-
ter of apology for refusing to intern the remains of an African Ameri-
can man. 235 The court reasoned that ordering an apology went
beyond the commission's power to require "affirmative action" be-
cause it "could well lead to varied, arbitrary and even oppressive or-
ders under the guise of giving proper effectuation of the purposes of
the Act."
2 3 6
In contrast, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld an order by
the State Commissioner of Human Rights requiring the president of a
company to apologize in writing to a former employee for "uttering
obscene and anti-Semitic remarks. '2 37 The Court held that the Com-
mission could have reasonably found it essential that the president
apologize to remedy the discrimination:
The petitioners' only argument is that an apology is not authorized
or appropriate under the circumstances. However, in view of the
231 Most federal civil rights cases are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes
"suits in equity" for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
232 See Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Requiring Apology as "Affirmative Action" or Other
Form of Redress Under State Civil Rights Act, 85 A.L.R.3D 402 (1978) (collecting cases that
discuss whether civil rights violators can or should be required to formally apologize).
233 See Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn. 1976) ("A letter of
apology is not a proper means to effectuate [the reversal of discriminatory effects].").
234 Id.
235 See Alto-Reste Park Cemetery Ass'n v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 298 A.2d 619,
623 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1972).
236 Id. at 623; see also State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Lieber, 277 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591
(App. Div. 1967) (holding that requiring a landlord to apologize for housing discrimina-
tion would be "a useless, vain and meaningless gesture"), rev'd on other grounds, State
Comm'n for Human Rights v. Lieber, 23 N.Y.2d 253 (1968).
237 Imperial Diner v. State Human Rights Appeals Bd., 417 N.E.2d 525, 526 (1980).
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commissioner's broad powers to fashion relief as well as the signifi-
cance the employer's refusal to apologize had in this case, it cannot
be said that ordering an apology was not essential to eliminate the
particular discriminatory practice the commissioner had found.2 38
These disparate decisions seem to reflect different assumptions
about whether compelled apologies are backward- or forward-looking;
that is, whether they are retroactive punishment or prospective re-
lief 2 39 Because the Pennsylvania and Minnesota courts conceptual-
ized compelled apologies only as a means of shaming the offender,
they inevitably concluded that the ordered apology was not prospec-
tive equitable relief, but rather impermissible retroactive punish-
ment.240 In contrast, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that
a compelled apology could send a corrective message and thereby rec-
tify past discrimination. 241 Moreover, as discussed above, an apology
can also prospectively heal psychological wounds of victims. 242 The
fact that courts frequently misuse forced apologies to shame and hu-
miliate criminal defendants does not mean that court-ordered apolo-
gies are inappropriate in the civil context. Rather, all that's needed is
a paradigm shift in which compelled apologies are crafted not to
shame, but rather to provide a prospective remedy to individuals ag-
grieved by governmental abuse and to send desirable social messages
to counteract such abuse. 243
This last point bears emphasis. For court-ordered apologies to
become reality, courts need only start ordering them, because they
already have the ability to order apologies as part of their power to
238 Id. at 529 n.*. The court declined to consider the dissent's concern that the com-
pelled apology violated the First Amendment. See id.
239 The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states seeking retroactive monetary re-
lief, but not those against municipalities. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978)
(per curiam). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials
for prospective injunctive relief. See, e.g., ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 103, § 7.5.1 (discussing Young). It's an open question whether
the Eleventh Amendment bars non-monetary retroactive relief against state officials. How-
ever, because the underlying purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect state trea-
suries, the stronger position would be that it does not. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 678 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars the retroactive payment of
benefits found to have been wrongfully withheld); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 103,
§§ 7.5.1-2. Nevertheless, because ordering an apology imposes a prospective requirement
(as one may not retroactively apologize) there is no need to resolve that issue here. See
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (holding that orders that
impose prospective requirements, as opposed to retroactive compensation, are permitted),
overruled by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
240 See Minneapolis v. Richardson, 239 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Minn. 1976); Alto-Reste Park,
298 A.2d at 623.
241 See Imperial Diner, 417 N.E.2d at 526.
242 See supra Part III.A.
243 Courts rightly reject apologies that are meant merely to humiliate offenders, in-
cluding most apologies currently ordered in the criminal justice system and most forced
apologies advanced by shaming advocates.
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grant equitable relief. Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 specifically authorizes
courts to grant equitable relief, as well as other necessary forms of
redress, against state and local governments. 244 Moreover, the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United
States in suits requesting equitable relief.245 While some might object
that ordering the executive branch to apologize raises potential sepa-
ration of powers concerns, compelled apologies pale in comparison
with other types of equitable relief that courts commonly order in civil
rights cases. For example, courts have taken over school systems that
failed to desegregate, 246 subjected prison systems to court control,247
and placed public mental hospitals under federal receivership. 248 As
long as courts continue to have the power to grant broad equitable
relief in civil rights cases, a compelled apology certainly falls within
the panoply of remedies that courts are empowered to grant.
E. The Law of Diminishing Returns
A final common objection to compelled apologies involves the
law of diminishing returns. According to this objection, at some point
each subsequent apology becomes less valuable than the one before,
eventually rendering public apologies meaningless.249 The public
would become so overloaded by apologies that it would simply stop
paying attention to them. While this objection has some validity, it
overstates the matter to assert that if a court-ordered apology were
available as a civil rights remedy, apologies would so flood the airwaves
that they would cease to have public meaning.
First, apology, like politics, is local. Apologies send particularized
messages about matters of local concern, and regardless of how many
apologies state actors make across the country, people care most
about what happens in their own communities. It strains reason to
assume that people will ignore apologies on matters of great impor-
tance in their community just because public apologies become more
common.
Moreover, the number of cases resulting in public apologies is
likely to remain relatively small. Civil rights cases make up a small
fraction of litigation in this country. And most civil rights cases will
244 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
245 5 U.S.C. § 702 (providing that an action that states a claim and involves non-mone-
tary damages shall not be dismissed on the ground that it is against the United States or
that the United States is an indispensable party); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 103,
§ 8.9, at 494.
246 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
247 See, e.g., Vazquez v. Carver, 18 F. Supp. 2d 503 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
248 See, e.g., Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1997).
249 See Massaro, supra note 29, at 1930-33; Skeel, supra note 29, at 1864.
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continue to settle before trial, probably without a public apology.250
Finally, despite the thousands of news stories on apologies, plaintiffs
still file lawsuits everyday in the hopes of receiving them. This persis-
tency of apology suggests that economic arguments of marginal utility
may ignore the inherent value of an apology to an individual who has
been wronged.
V
THE ART OF COMPELLED APOLOGY
A. Framing the Apology
Though it can appear simple, a successful apology must be care-
fully crafted. Few people are good at apologizing, because one's incli-
nation is to offer a "pseudo-apology" that protects one's ego. 251 Some
common examples of such apologies include: "I'm sorry if you were
hurt"; "If I made a mistake, I'm sorry"; "I'm sorry, but I don't see what
you're getting so bent out of shape about"; "I'm sorry, but I was only
doing what I thought was best." 252 These pseudo-apologies preserve
the apologizer's ego by the using passive voice to obscure the apolo-
gizer's role, questioning whether the victim was actually hurt, casting
doubt upon whether the offender did anything wrong, minimizing
the harm by blaming the victim for being oversensitive, or offering a
self-serving justification. 253
Public apologies often suffer from similar deficiencies. Consider
the following example: On April 25, 2005, 'Jersey Guys" radio hosts
Craig Carton and Ray Rossi were discussingJun Choi, a Korean Ameri-
can running for Mayor of Edison, New Jersey, on their morning
show. 254 Carton mocked Choi by affecting a "Chinese" accent. He
stated: "I don't care if the Chinese population in Edison has quadru-
250 Conceivably, however, the prospect of being ordered to apologize publicly follow-
ing a trial will induce more governments to agree to offer apologies to plaintiffs as part of
the settlement process. One advantage of litigation for governmental defendants is never
having to say they're sorry-even when they anticipate losing at trial. This dynamic is par-
ticularly at play where it would be unpopular or embarrassing for the government to con-
cede the plaintiffs point. Even when the government loses, it saves face by vowing to
appeal, regardless of whether it ever does. The prospect of a court-ordered apology at the
end of the litigation process might change the government's calculation.
251 See Lazare, supra note 22, at 8. Apologies can be so difficult that a string of recent
self-help books offer advice on how to give them. See, e.g., KEN BLANCHARD & MARGARET
McBRIDE, THE ONE MINUTE APOLOGY. A POWERFUL WAY TO MAKE THINGS BETTER (2003);
KEITH MICHAEL HEARIT, CRISIS MANAGEMENT BY APOLOGN, CORPORATE RESPONSES TO ALLE-
GATIONS OF WRONGDOING (2005); SUSAN KENT, LEARNING How TO SAY You ARE SORRY
(2001).
252 See, e.g., [AzARE, supra note 22, at 8.
253 See id. at 85-106 (describing the various self-serving ways in which one can under-
cut an apology).
254 See Guillermo, supra note 20.
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pled in the last year, Chinese should never dictate the outcome of an
American election, Americans should. 255
Outraged, a coalition of over a hundred Asian American and anti-
hate-speech groups banded together and demanded a public apology.
Initially, the station refused to acknowledge wrongdoing or even meet
with the coalition. 256 But after a month of protests and mounting
pressure, the station posted the following statement on its Web site:
Some of the humor from our show is satire and parody which, by its
very nature, is occasionally cutting edge. It is intended to entertain
the listener. It is not-and never will be at this station-intended to
play to our baser nature or to encourage or feed prejudices.
Unfortunately, a portion of our April 25th broadcast was offensive
and insensitive, particularly to members of the Asian American com-
munity. We are genuinely sorry the offensive material was aired.
We would like to take this opportunity to assure our listeners of our
commitment to respect our diverse communities.257
In addition to the station's written apology, Carton apologized on air
to Choi: "Man to man, I'm sorry. The intent was never to hurt you
personally or hurt your mayoral campaign." Carton further "apolo-
gized" to any listener who was offended. 258
While the station's apology does several things well, it fails as a
successful apology in a number of regards. First, by self-servingly call-
ing its programming cutting edge, the station suggests that listeners
who were upset simply do not understand satire. Of course, it would
be hard for anyone to see what was cutting edge about these racist
comments. But the station obscures the offensiveness of the com-
ments with vague language: "[A] portion of our April 25th broadcast
was offensive and insensitive, particularly to members of the Asian
American community." Those who read the apology without knowing
the original statements would not be able to tell from the reference to
"a portion of the April 25th broadcast" how racist Carton's comments
actually were. Next, the station mitigates its responsibility by claiming
that it never intended to "play to our baser nature or encourage or
feed prejudices." 259 While it's again hard to see what else Carton
might have intended, the station's denial of intentionality serves to
minimize its and Carton's culpability. Moreover, given that the station
obscured Carton's racist statement, the reader of the apology is left
with the impression that the station really did nothing wrong and is








cans. Finally, the station fails to take full responsibility for airing the
comments. Rather, the station speaks in the passive voice: "We are
genuinely sorry the offensive material was aired." 260 The use of the
passive "was aired" makes it sound as if the station played no role in
the decision to air it.
Carton's apology to Choi is even worse. First, the "man to man"
comment can be read to suggest that Choi is acting like a baby. In
other words, if Choi were "man enough" he would have been able to
take it in the first place and would now let it go without complaint.
Second, Carton seems not to fully understand why his comments were
wrong. His comments weren't just hurtful; they were racist. People
were outraged by Carton not because they thought he was trying to
hurt Choi's mayoral campaign, but because of his racist statement, use
of a mocking Chinese accent, and suggestion that Asian Americans
are not real Americans. He also engaged in yellow perilism by appeal-
ing to base fears that "Chinese" are trying to interfere in the political
process of "real" Americans.
These deficiencies were not lost on the intended recipients. For
example, Choi explained to Carton, "It wasn't that I was offended per-
sonally or found your comments hurtful, I believe it crossed a line. By
saying these groups were un-American, that was what hurt me."261 Kai
Yu, founder of Asian Media Watch, acknowledged but did not accept
the apology.262 And journalist Emil Guillermo rejected as irrelevant
Carton's statement that he did not intend to hurt Choi.263 Guillermo
offered an example of what would have been a more acceptable apol-
ogy: "I'm sorry I made comments that demonstrated my total and ut-
ter ignorance of Asians and Asian Americans. The comments about
the community were hurtful, intimidating and racist. I may have
meant them to be entertainment, but it was anything but that. It
won't happen again."264
While this suggested apology is still imperfect, it's much im-
proved. Moreover, by looking at the difference between Guillermo's
suggested apology and the actual apologies of the station and Carton,
one can decipher the components of a successful apology. First, an
apology should acknowledge the wrongdoing in concrete and unam-
biguous terms, should use the active voice so that the wrongdoer will
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. When an apology is inadequate for whatever reason-timing, wording, inade-
quacy compared with the harm suffered-the recipient of the apology often acknowledges
the apology without accepting it. In this way, the power remains with the offended party,
who can choose when to accept the apology, or not accept it at all. See LAzxAa, supra note
22, at 178.




be evident, and should identify the injured party:265 "I made com-
ments that demonstrated my total and utter ignorance of Asians and
Asian Americans." 266 Second, it should acknowledge the harm done
without blaming the victim, minimizing the harm, questioning the le-
gitimacy of the victim's suffering, or cloaking the harm in conditional-
ity:2 6 7  "The comments about the community were hurtful,
intimidating and racist." 268 Third, it should accept full responsibility
and disavow any excuse for the behavior:269 "I may have meant them
to be entertainment, but it was anything but that." Fourth, it should
express remorse:270 "I'm sorry," or, "We are genuinely sorry." Fifth, it
should promise to refrain from repeating the offense: 271 "It won't
happen again," or, in the station's apology, "We would like to take this
opportunity to assure our listeners of our commitment to respect our
diverse communities. '" 272 Finally, the apologizer should offer repara-
tions or take other measures to make amends. 273 For example, the
station fined Carton and donated the money to a charity.
While the most successful apologies will contain all six compo-
nents, an apology that does even some of these things can have lim-
ited success. For example, despite its many failings, the station's
apology expressed deep regret, affirmed its commitment to respecting
diversity, and offered symbolic reparations by donating money to
charity. As such, the apology was welcomed by some as "gratifying, '274
and seems to have helped restore the station's standing in the Asian
and Asian American community. Despite his complaints, Guillermo
capitulated: "But hey, we'll take our justice like our pizza. By the
slice." 275 He also characterized the apology as "[n]ot bad."276
265 See LzARE, supra note 22, at 88-90; Erin Ann O'Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology
and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1133-36 (2002) (describing three key elements to a
successful apology).
266 Here, the apology should probably also identify precisely what those comments
were.
267 See LkzARE, supra note 22, at 91-97; O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 265, at 1133.
268 Even Guillermo's suggested apology is not quite as clear about who the injured
party was as it could be. For example, here he might have suggested, "The comments were
racist and hurtful and intimidating to the Asian and Asian American community."
269 See LAZARE, supra note 22, at 85, 90.
270 See O'Hara & Yarn, supra note 265, at 1134.
271 See id.
272 Guillermo, supra note 20.
273 See Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 487 ("An apology without reparation is a
hollow form, at least when the injured person has suffered a clear economic loss and when
the actor has the capacity to make compensation."); see also LAZARE, supra note 22, at 127;
Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER RACE &JusT. 47, 54 (1997) (discussing apolo-
gies and reparations in the context of racial groups' attempts to redress historical wrongs).
274 Guillermo, supra note 20.
275 Id.




As one can see from this example, the precise wording of a public
apology is extremely important. The record of the public apology be-
comes the apologetic fact that might later be read and unconsciously
dissected by literally millions of people. 277 And like Lincoln's apology
for slavery, it becomes a piece of historical testimony.27a As such,
courts must take care in crafting court-ordered apologies and should
do so only after fully understanding the nature of the defendant's ac-
tions and the plaintiff's suffering. Any ambiguity or equivocation un-
dermines the effectiveness of the apology and may do more damage
than good.
B. Identifying Who Should Make the Apology
In the case of public collectives, it won't always be clear who
should make the apology. 2 79 While one obvious candidate is the ac-
tual offender, this might not always be possible. For example, a police
officer facing criminal charges for using excessive force would have a
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Thus, someone else, such as
the police chief, would have to convey the apology. Such an apology
is akin to an apology from a parent for a child's misbehavior. Society
accepts, and sometimes demands, such apologies because it's com-
monly understood that a parent is ultimately responsible for the be-
havior of their child. The parent apologizes not only for the child's
failing, but also for their failure to keep a better watch on the child.
Similarly, most members of the public would accept an apology from
the police chief for the officers' acts, because they ultimately hold the
police chief accountable for ensuring that the officers do not abuse
their authority.
Sometimes, however, it may be difficult to decide who should
apologize because there will be many offenders. At other times, it may
be difficult to identify any particular offender because of collective
incompetence. In such cases, it may suffice for a government spokes-
person to offer the apology. When the offense is severe, however,
There's victory, sweet victory, in NewJersey! The activists can't gloat. That
would be impolitic. So let me go amok for them. We got the apology. Or
rather, they did for all of us. After a month of negotiations, a coalition of
Asian American and community groups against hate speech received an on-
air apology May 25 from Millennium Broadcasting's NewJersey 101.5 FM
and its two foul-mouthed DJs who insulted Asian Americans on-air last
month.
277 See generally TAVUCHIS, supra note 1, at 105-07 (discussing several public apologies
arising from events surrounding World War II that reached many people).
278 Lincoln's apology for slavery during his Second Inaugural Address is an eloquent
and powerful testament to the evil of slavery. See Brooks, supra note 28, at 360-61 (repro-
ducing Lincoln's speech).
279 See generally LAZARE, supra note 22, at 40 (contrasting private apologies, where the
identification of the apologizer is easy, with public apologies, where it is less so).
1308 [Vol. 91:1261
COURT-ORDERED APOLOGIES
sometimes only an apology from the person with ultimate responsibil-
ity really counts. For example, even though Secretary of Defense Don-
ald Rumsfeld eventually apologized for abuses at Abu Ghraib,280
President Bush has been severely criticized for failing to apologize to
the Iraqi people as Commander in Chief.281
With court-ordered apologies, the question of who should apolo-
gize for a particular offense is ultimately a fact-sensitive inquiry.282
Given that courts are especially qualified to make such inquiries, the
question of who apologizes should be left to the court's discretion.
C. Deciding on a Forum for the Apology
A related question is the appropriate forum for the apology.
Some forums are obviously more public than others. Because of the
number of possibilities and the variables with each, the appropriate
forum for the apology, like the determination of the most appropriate
person to deliver it, must be left to the court's discretion.283 Never-
theless, a number of factors should guide the court's determination,
including the targeted audience, the severity of the offense, the extent
to which the offense is publicly known, the degree to which the coun-
tervailing message is ingrained in the public psyche, and the impor-
tance of the value at stake. The key, as for all remedial orders, is
proportionality.
Additionally, plaintiffs should have considerable say in choosing
the forum for the apology. It should go without saying that if the
plaintiff asks for a letter of apology a court should not order the de-
fendant to blast the apology on a billboard. Likewise, if the plaintiff
desires the relative quiet of a courtroom apology, a court should re-
280 See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Runsfeld Takes Responsibility for Abuse, WASH. POST, May 8,
2004, at Al.
281 See, e.g., Fred Kaplan, Why Bush Didn't Apologize, SLATE, May 5, 2004, http://www.
slate.com/id/2100015/. While Mr. Dasrath, for example, eventually received a letter ex-
pressing regret from Continental customer service, he rejected it because he felt the apol-
ogy should come from the pilot or at least someone with supervisory authority over the
pilot. See Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
282 For example, if those at the top ordered or encouraged the abuse, they should
apologize. If a supervisor fails in her duty to monitor her subordinates and allows grievous
abuse, she has to assume responsibility. On the other hand, if some inadvertent bureau-
cratic blunder causes the harm, an apology from a government spokesperson could suffice.
283 For instance, a courtroom is a quasi-public setting, and an apology given in court is
likely to be heard by only a few people. An apology in a newspaper can be more visible,
but not if the apology is buried alongside other public notices where few people are likely
to see it. An apology aired on television could be more prominent, but the number of
people who view it depends on what time, what station, and how often it's aired. Other
possible forums include Web sites, posters on city buses, billboards, and public notices in
government offices. Each of these also presents an additional list of variables, including
how prominently the apology should be placed on the Web site, how many city buses it




spect this desire, perhaps in the form of the public woodshedding dis-
cussed above. 28 4 But if the plaintiff has sought an apology to be
vindicated publicly, or to send a public message about acceptable and
unacceptable behavior, courts should ensure that the forum for the
apology is indeed a public one. 28 5 Though the offenses may have
been committed in anonymity-such as a suspect beaten in an alley-
court-ordered apologies for such offenses cannot take place in the
dark if intended to harness the considerable restorative and remedial
power of a public apology.28 6
D. The Continuing Need for Other Remedies
Finally, an apology lacking restitution can be a "hollow form."28 7
If you wreck someone's car, even the most profuse apology, without
an offer to repair the damage, is meaningless. As Eric Yamamoto
notes in his article Race Apologies, dealing with the separate issue of
reparations for historical racial injustice, "In some circumstances, ac-
knowledgment of responsibility for a racial group's historical wounds
may itself be enough to foster healing. In other instances, something
more may be needed because 'repentance without restitution is
empty.' "288 This point, of course, is equally true in the case of court-
ordered apologies for contemporary civil rights violations. Thus,
when a plaintiff has been harmed in some quantifiable manner,
courts should also require that defendants provide compensation lest
plaintiffs and the public perceive a court-ordered apology as mere
words or a way to let the government off easy. 28 9 A court-ordered
apology should be a supplement to, not a substitute for, other
remedies.
284 See supra text accompanying notes 171-75.
285 Mr. Dasrath noted, "I want them to apologize in public. Maybe issue a press re-
lease. Many people know about it because it's been in the news. I want the public to know
what happened and that it was wrong." Interview with Michael Dasrath, supra note 61.
286 See TAvuctus, supra note 1, at 70-71 (" [A]pologetic discourse between the One and
the Many takes place and unfolds in a public domain from beginning to end, no matter
how limited the engaged public may be. It's this that invests the exchange with new pur-
pose and significance. For publicity, ventilated speech, does more than direct attention to
a plurality of offended parties; it situates the offender in a sociolinguistic territory whose
logic and economy require a particular kind of display or,-more aptly, performance.").
287 Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 2, at 487.
288 Yamamoto, supra note 273, at 54.
289 While restitution may be necessary, the particular type of restitution will vary ac-
cording to the harm suffered. At times, reparation will be injunctive in nature, as in the
case of affirmative action programs for hiring and promoting individuals of races that have
suffered discrimination. At others, in cases where the injury is intangible, symbolic repara-
tion can be offered. See LAzARE, supra note 22, at 127. The case of the New Jersey radio




Together with traditional forms of redress, court-ordered apolo-
gies offer the possibility of providing complete remedies to civil rights
plaintiffs who would otherwise be inadequately compensated for psy-
chological and symbolic injuries. While the countervailing concerns
of freedom of speech and conscience likely preclude the use of court-
order apologies as a general civil remedy, these concerns are not sig-
nificant barriers to apologies by official state actors. To the contrary,
citizens should look to government officials to set examples as to
proper social, moral, and legal behavior. It's thus critically important
that courts hold the government responsible when it abuses the rights
of citizens.290 Because of their high expressive utility, court-ordered
apologies could be effective in apportioning responsibility for human
injustice. Likewise, court-ordered ap9logies could help heal the psy-
chological wounds of victims, send desirable social messages, reinforce
accepted norms, and restore social equilibrium. Moreover, these ben-
efits are immediately realizable, as courts already have the equitable
power to compel apologies. Civil rights attorneys thus should start
specifically requesting court-ordered apologies in appropriate cases.
Furthermore, courts should grant such requests whenever they find
that a court-ordered apology is necessary to provide a complete rem-
edy to an aggrieved individual or group.
290 See Bandes, supra note 115, at 1211.
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